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The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
Civil War and Reconstruction, 1865-1873
David P. Currie t
The appointment of Salmon P. Chase as Chief Justice in De-
cember 1864, like that of his predecessor in 1836, marked the be-
ginning of a new epoch in the Court's history. Not only had the
Civil War altered the legal landscape dramatically; Chase was to
preside over an essentially new complement of Justices. Of those
who had sat more than a few years with Chief Justice Roger Ta-
ney, only Samuel Nelson and Robert Grier were to remain for a
significant time. With them were six newcomers appointed be-
tween 1858 and 1864, five of them by Abraham Lincoln and four of
them Republicans: Nathan Clifford, Noah H. Swayne, Samuel F.
Miller, David Davis, Stephen J. Field, and Chase himself. These
eight Justices were to sit together through most of the period until
Chase's death in 1873. Taney's longtime colleagues James M.
Wayne and John Catron were gone by 1867; William Strong, Jo-
seph P. Bradley, and Ward Hunt, appointed at the end of Chase's
tenure, played relatively minor roles. The work of the Chase period
was largely done by eight men.1
Chase was Chief Justice for less than nine years, but his ten-
ure was a time of important constitutional decisions. Most of the
significant cases fall into three categories. The best known cases,
which serve as the subject of this article, involve a variety of ques-
tions arising out of the Civil War itself. Less dramatic but of com-
parable impact on future litigation and of comparable jurispruden-
tial interest were a number of decisions determining the inhibitory
effect of the commerce clause on state legislation. Finally, at the
very end of the Chase period the Court for the first time turned to
the task of interpreting the constitutional amendments adopted as
a result of the war, a labor that would absorb a major part of the
t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I should like to thank Paul
Mishkin, Michael E. Smith, Geoffrey Stone, and Cass Sunstein for helpful criticism and
Mark Holmes for valuable research assistance.
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energies of Justices down to the present day.'
My aim here, as in studies of earlier periods in the Court's
history,s is to explore and to criticize the Justices' methods of con-
stitutional interpretation. Useful insights can sometimes be
gleaned from cases whose holdings are of no particular interest,
and the total workload of the Court is an important factor in de-
termining how the Justices approach the writing of any single
opinion. Thus, although from considerations of economy I shall fo-
cus primarily upon the more important cases, I shall also ttempt
to convey a more or less comprehensive overview of the constitu-
tional work of the Chase period as a whole.4
'JusTICES OF THE SUPREM COURT DURING THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF SALMON P.
CHASE
1864 1866 1868 1870 1872
James M. Wayne (1835-1867).
John Catron (1837-1865) -
Samuel Nelson (1845-1872)
Robert C. Grier (1846-1870)
Nathan Clifford (1858-1881)
Noah H. Swayne (1862-1881)
Samuel F. Miller (1862-1890)
David Davis (1862-1877)
Stephen J. Field (1863-1897)
Salmon P. Chase (1864-1873)
William Strong (1870-1880)
Joseph P. Bradley (1870-1892)
Ward Hunt (1872-1892) -
SOURCE: Adapted from G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. A,
at A-2 to A-4 (10th ed. 1980).
S The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments were among the principal legacies of the
rebellion; yet because their interpretation first confronted the Court during the last days of
Chase's tenure, the decisions addressing them are considered, along with the commerce
clause cases of the Chase period, in an article in the next issue of this Review.
' Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 819
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Currie I]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The
Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 646 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Currie II]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Pow-
ers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CH. L. REv. 887 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Currie I]; Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: Contracts and Commerce, 1836-1864, 1983 DUKE L.J.
471 [hereinafter cited as Currie IV]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Arti-
cle IV and Federal Powers, 1836-1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 695 [hereinafter cited as Currie V].
The entire study of the first hundred years will be published in book form by the University
of Chicago Press.
4 The leading general histories of the Court during the Chase period are the excellent
C. FARMAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1971) [hereinafter
cited as FAmAN, HISTORY], and 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HIS-
TORY (rev. ed. 1926). The best biographies of the Justices are C. FAiEMAN, MR. JUSTICE
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An event as cataclysmic as the Civil War was bound to place
considerable strain on the Constitution, and the brunt of the judi-
cial burden of putting it back in shape was borne in the decade
following the War itself-the period considered in this study.'
A series of landmark opinions characterizes this aspect of the
Court's work. Ex parte Milligan' invalidated military trials of ci-
vilians. Cummings v. Missouri7 and Ex parte Garlands struck
down state and federal test oaths enacted after the War. Missis-
sippi v. Johnson,9 Georgia v. Stanton,10 Ex parte McCardle," and
United States v. Klein 2 laid down important principles of federal
jurisdiction in the course of generally unavailing attempts to ob-
tain a judicial test of Reconstruction measures. Texas v. Whitel'
finally established both the illegality of secession and the validity
of the basic Reconstruction principle. Wartime financial measures
produced several important opinions culminating in the invalida-
tion of paper tender under questionable circumstances in Hepburn
v. Griswold14 and in the prompt overruling of that case after two
new Justices were appointed. 5
I. MILITARY TRIALS AND TEST OATHS
A. Ex parte Milligan
Sentenced to death by a military commission in Indiana dur-
ing the war for giving aid to the rebellion, Milligan sought habeas
MILLER AND THE SUPREME CouRT 1862-1890 (1939) [hereinafter cited as FAIRMAN, MILLER]
and C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD, CRAFTSmAN OF THE LAW (1930). Others include P. CLir-
FORD, NATHAN CLIFFORD, DEMOCRAT (1922), A. HART, SALMON PORTLAND CHASE (1899), W.
KING, LINCOLN'S MANAGER: DAVID DAVIS (1960), A. LAWRENCE, JAMES MOORE WAYNE, SOUTH-
ERN UNIONIST (1943), and J. SCHUCKERS, THE LIFE AND PuBLic SERVIcES OF SALMON PORT-
LAND CHASE (1874), the last of which oddly makes virtually no reference to Supreme Court
decisions.
5 The Civil War litigation was one factor contributing to an enormous increase in the
Justices' workload. In the first 75 years of its existence the Court had produced 68 volumes
of decisions; in Chase's nine terms it produced 15. The increase in constitutional litigation
was more striking still: in less than nine years under Chase the Court resolved as many
constitutional cases as it had in the preceding 28 years. For discussion of the increasing
docket problems, see, for example, FAIRMAN, MILLER, supra note 4, at 401-08; F. FRANK-
FURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT ch. 6 (1928).
a 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
7 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
8 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
* 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
20 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868).
12 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
22 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
" 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
14 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
' Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1872).
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corpus from a federal circuit court. On certified questions the Su-
preme Court held, in a celebrated 1866 opinion by Lincoln's old
friend David Davis, that the military trial of a civilian under such
circumstances was unconstitutional.16
Davis's discussion of the constitutional question begins with
one of the Court's most stirring affirmations of the rule of law:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield
of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious conse-
quences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of
its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exi-
gencies of government. 17
The merits, wrote Davis, were plain from the words of the
Constitution. "Every trial involves the exercise of judicial power,"
and article III vests that power in "'one supreme court and such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.'" "One of the plainest constitutional provisions was,
therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not or-
dained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges
appointed during good behavior."18 Moreover, the sixth amend-
's 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). The question had been avoided during the war itself in Ex
parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864), where the Court held it had no jurisdic-
tion to review directly the judgment of a military commission. See Currie V, supra note 3, at
726 n.199. Of the various jurisdictional objections brushed aside in Milligan, the only one of
interest was that the case was moot because it should be presumed that the petitioner had
been hanged as directed. "[E]ven the suggestion [that the military had executed Milligan
while his case was pending]," said Davis, "is injurious to the Executive, and we dismiss it
from further consideration." 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 118. In fact, Milligan had been reprieved
and was later released in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision. See 2 C. WARREN,
supra note 4, at 427 n.1. For the guess that the Court would not have reached the same bold
decision on the merits while the war was still going, see, for example, C. SWISHER, supra
note 4, at 138; L. TRIBE, AmERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 181 (1978). For a comprehensive
description of the case and its historical context, see FAiRmAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at
185-237.
17 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120-21; see also id. at 123-24:
When peace prevails, and the authority of the government is undisputed, there is no
difficulty of preserving the safeguards of liberty;. . . but if society is disturbed by civil
commotion-if the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law weakened, if
not disregarded-these safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of those
intrusted with the guardianship of the Constitution and laws.
But cf. 1 G. LEFEBVRE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 125 (1962) ("[T]hat one could not govern in
time of war and revolution as in time of peace- . . that. . . rights.., depended upon
circumstances . . . [-] was to become the doctrine of the [French] revolutionary gov-
ernment.").
Is 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121-22 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
[51:131
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ment had been offended as well, for it guaranteed that "'in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . .
trial by an impartial jury."' 19
Having said this, Davis began in dicta to take much of it back.
First, he conceded, soldiers were not entitled to jury trials for mili-
tary offenses, for the fifth amendment excepts from its grand-jury
requirement "'cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public danger,'"
and "the framers,... doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by
jury, in the sixth amendment, to those persons who were subject to
indictment or presentment in the fifth."20 Though unnecessary to
the decision, this concession was necessitated by longstanding
practice and was in accord with an earlier dictum.2 1 Moreover,
though one may feel queasy over the Court's conclusion that the
fifth amendment's military exception applies to the sixth as well, it
helps to reconcile the conviction that the Framers had not meant
to abolish traditional courts-martial with the apparently uncom-
promising text of the Constitution.2
More troubling is what follows:
If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually
closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice ac-
cording to law, then, on the theatre of active military opera-
tions, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish
a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to pre-
serve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is
left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule
until the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates
the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is
continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpa-
tion of power.... Because, during the late Rebellion [martial
rule] could have been enforced in Virginia, where the national
authority was overturned and the courts driven out, it does
29 Id. at 122-23 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
20 Id. at 123 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
" See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858).
2 A still earlier precedent involving territorial courts, American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), provides further evidence that article M was not quite so ironclad
as Davis would have us believe, but the special status of the territories and the Court's
explicit statement that its permissive holding did not apply within the states, id. at 546,
niake Davis's failure to distinguish the case a matter more of style than of substance. See
Currie 11, supra note 3, at 716-19. For a more general discussion of the problem of judicial
power outside article III, see Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary,
16 CRMGHTON L. REv. 441 (1983).
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not follow that it should obtain in Indiana, where that author-
ity was never disputed, and justice was always administered.23
There was no occasion to say any of this, for, as the Court
emphasized, in Indiana "the courts were open," and there were no
hostile armies. 4 More disturbing yet is the implication of this
obiter pronouncement, for it undermines the very basis of the
Court's decision. If military courts may try civilians whenever mili-
tary necessity demands it, then neither article III nor the jury pro-
vision is plain on its face after all. Moreover, while in the purely
formal sense the Court may still be right that the Constitution is
not "suspended" in an emergency, it might as well be, for appar-
ently its provisions implicitly include exceptions for emergency
conditions.
Davis's dicta thus deprive his earlier ringing statements of
much of their force. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that he was right about military tribunals in places
where war had interrupted the civil courts. Just as it is hard to
believe the Framers meant by ostensibly unqualified language to
overturn the tradition of sovereign immunity,25 it is hard to believe
they meant to do away with the tradition that occupying armies
may temporarily govern.26 Milligan was not the occasion for saying
2S 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 127.
24 Id. at 126-27.
15 See Currie I, supra note 3, at 831-39 (discussing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793)).
26 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (allowing military trials of enemies for
violating the laws of war):
The object of [§ 2 of article III] was to preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those
cases in which it had been recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like
nature as they might arise in the future,. . . but not to bring within the sweep of the
guaranty those cases in which it was then well understood that a jury trial could not be
demanded as of right (citation omitted).
Article HI's tenure requirement was not discussed. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 178-
211 and note 196 (discussing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), and The Grape-
shot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129 (1870)). In Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871)
(Strong, J.), the Court, upholding over two dissents (Field and Clifford) the power of Con-
gress to confiscate rebel property without a jury trial on the acceptable ground that this was
not punishment for crime at all, went to the shocking extreme of declaring that exercises of
the war powers were never "affected by the restrictions imposed by the fifth and sixth
amendments." Id. at 305-06. Counsel for the United States had so argued in Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) at 20-21, 102-05 (argument of Messrs. Speed and Butler), quoting a speech by
John Quincy Adams, id. at 104 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 433 (1836)
(statement of Rep. Adams)). Cf. FAmMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 201 ("A competent
Attorney General would never have permitted such an outlandish argument to be made
.... "). The decision in Milligan, which rejected this position, was naturally ignored in
Miller.
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so; Davis could have satisfied the demands of candor without ap-
pearing to destroy the basis of his own holding. Rather than over-
emphasizing the constitutional text and then taking it back, Davis
might better have begun by observing that it was unnecessary to
decide whether the Framers meant to do away with traditional
military powers to govern either military personnel or conquered
territories; it was enough that neither of those traditions came
close to justifying an implied exception for the case at hand, and
that a strong showing would be required to demonstrate that the
Framers had not meant what they said.27
Davis's opinion was joined by Nelson, Grier, Clifford, and
Field-the Court's four Northern Democrats. Chase, with his fel-
low Republicans Swayne and Miller and the old Georgian Wayne,
concurred on narrower grounds. 8 There was no need, they said, to
hold that Congress had no power to authorize military trials of ci-
vilians in cases like Milligan's, for Congress had never purported to
do so. Indeed, they argued, it had forbidden them. The statute
that gave the circuit court jurisdiction of Milligan's habeas corpus
petition required the release of all military prisoners once a civil
grand jury had met and failed to indict them, and Milligan fell
squarely within the statutory terms."9
Convincing enough on this point,30 Chase opened himself to
27 For the position that Davis's distinction was in accord with that drawn in English
common law, see FAiRMAN, MILLzR, supra note 4, at 96, and the argument of counsel for the
petitioner, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 47 (argument of Mr. Garfield) (quoting M. HALE, THE His-
TORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 42-43 (Runnington ed. London 1820) (1st ed.
London 1713)). Cf. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, ComMENTARms *400:
"[T]he necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing which can give
[martial law] countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of peace,
when the king's courts are open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws
of the land."
Not altogether easy to distinguish, of course, is the later Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
See supra note 26. It might be argued that Milligan too was an enemy spy offending the
laws of war. So to hold, however, would come close to saying that every case of treason is
outside the jury and judge protections of article I-a hard position to maintain since it is
the same article that narrowly defines the substantive offense itself.
18 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 132-42. This was not the first time the sturdy Southerner had
been more supportive of Yankee war powers than several of his Northern brethren. See
Currie V, supra note 3, at 746 (discussing the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863),
where Wayne cast the decisive vote to uphold Lincoln's blockade of Southern ports).
29 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 133-36 (invoking the Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, §§ 2, 3, 12 Stat.
755, 755-56 (expired by its own terms at end of war)). Davis relied on this statute to support
the circuit court's jurisdiction over Milligan's petition, see id. at 115-16; he did not discuss
whether it also required Milligan's release, and this argument was not much pressed by
counsel.
$0 Fairman terms this "an exceedingly generous construction of the statute that author-
ized the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus-imputing to Congress an
1984]
The University of Chicago Law Review
his own criticism by adding that he thought Congress could have
authorized a military trial.3 1 The bulk of his argument was devoted
to a demonstration of the relatively easy conclusion that military
tribunals may be necessary and proper to the raising and govern-
ance of armies and to the conduct of war. 2 On the harder question
whether those powers were not limited by the explicit guarantees
invoked by the majority, Chase said only that the fifth amendment
exception for "'[c]ases arising in the land or naval forces'" should
be construed to include "protection and defence as well as ... in-
ternal administration." 3 Language proposed by the state conven-
tions ratifying the original Constitution was plausibly if unconvinc-
ingly invoked to support this broad interpretation, 4 but the
language actually chosen by Congress is not conducive to Chase's
conclusion, and even the rejected terminology did not compel the
Court to equate Indiana with Virginia.
Despite Davis's brave words, then, the difference between him
and Chase seems one of degree rather than of principle. The whole
Court conceded unnecessarily that civil courts and juries would
yield in the face of military necessity; Chase differed from Davis
only in thinking the situation in Indiana serious enough to justify a
military tribunal.3 5 Nonetheless, many of our most important
intention at the same time to prohibit the military trial of civilians. ... FAIRMAN, HIS-
TORY, supra note 4, at 210. In light of the Court's familiar principle of construing statutes if
possible to avoid having to find government action unconstitutional, however, Chase's posi-
tion seems entirely reasonable.
31 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 136-42. Fairman agrees that Chase's constitutional discussion
was as unnecessary as Davis's but adds fairly enough that "it seems that the minority would
have been content to confine themselves to the facts of the particular case if the majority
had done so." FAiRMAN, MILLER, supra note 4, at 97 n.60. For contemporaneous criticism of
the majority for deciding too much, see 1 AM. L. REv. 572 (1867), quoted in 2 C. WARREN,
supra note 4, at 441-42.
32 Even on this issue one must be wary, as Marshall warned, not to extend the logic of
the relation between means and ends to its extreme without regard to the "spirit" of the
Constitution. This spirit includes the notion that the people as well as the states retain
some unspecified interests not subject to federal incursion. See Currie III, supra note 3, at
928-34 (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)); see also Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19-41 (1957) (holding, without relying on the limitations invoked in Mil-
ligan, that the necessary and proper clause did not authorize courts-martial of civilians con-
nected with the armed services); cf. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.").
- 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 137-39 (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. V).
Id. at 138 (" 'except in such cases as may arise in the government and regulation of
the land forces'" (emphasis added)).
35 See id. at 140 (stressing that Indiana "was the theatre of military operations, had
been actually invaded, and was constantly threatened with invasion" and that it was appar-
ently the home of "a powerful secret association . . . plotting insurrection").
[51:131
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rights turn on subjective questions of degree; and Milligan's will-
ingness to reject a plea of military necessity, though falling short of
the romantic vision with which the opinion began, stands nonethe-
less as an important landmark in the judicial protection of civil
liberties.3
B. The Test Oath Cases
At the end of the war both Congress and the people of Mis-
souri adopted provisions requiring that persons seeking to carry on
specified professional occupations subscribe to an oath that they
had never given aid to the rebellion. 7 Missouri convicted a priest
for practicing his calling without taking the state oath, and a for-
mer Confederate congressman asked the Supreme Court for per-
mission to practice before it without taking the federal one. In
the famous decisions in Cummings v. Missouri8 and Ex parte
Garland,39 a closely divided Court held both requirements un-
36 Along the way Chase offered an interesting insight into a constitutional question dis-
tinct from that resolved by the majority: since Congress was the lawmaker and the Presi-
dent the Commander-in-Chief under article H, Chase wrote, "Congress cannot direct the
conduct of campaigns, nor can the President, . .. without the sanction of Congress, insti-
tute tribunals for the trial and punishment of offences, either of soldiers or civilians, unless
in cases of a controlling necessity. . . ." Id. at 139-40 (emphasis added). Both halves of this
statement seem reasonable enough, but Chase had no occasion for making it since he had
already concluded that Congress had forbidden the President to set up such tribunals with-
out discussing whether it had power to impose such a restriction. Cf. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Justice Black's opinion for the Court seeming to
announce that the President could not seize the steel mills to assure war production without
statutory authorization, though a majority of Justices concluded that Congress had forbid-
den the seizure); Currie III, supra note 3, at 957-58 (discussing The Flying Fish, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 170 (1804)).
37 The federal statute was the Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502, which read in
part:
[E]very person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the gov-
ernment of the United States ... shall, before entering upon the duties of such office,
... take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: "I, A.B., do solemnly swear
(or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States. . .; that
I have voluntarily given no aid.., to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto
Missouri's provision was part of its newly adopted constitution:
The oath to be taken as aforesaid shall be known as the Oath of Loyalty, and shall
be in the following terms:
"I, A.B., do solemnly swear... that I have always been truly and loyally on the
side of the United States against all enemies thereof, foreign and domestic. .. ."
Within sixty days after this constitution takes effect, every person in this State
holding any office of honor, trust, or profit ... shall take and subscribe the said oath.
Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. H, §§ 6, 7.
- 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
39 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
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constitutional.4"
Both decisions were written by Justice Field, a California
Democrat appointed by Lincoln. Disqualification from an occupa-
tion, he argued with impressive support from history and from the
impeachment provisions of the Constitution, was a traditional pun-
ishment for crime.41 Thus the oath laws both made criminal cer-
tain acts that had not been forbidden when committed and in-
flicted additional punishments for those that had been; they
therefore were ex post facto laws prohibited to both Congress and
the states by sections nine and ten of article 1.42 It was no excuse,
said Field, that the laws disqualified not rebel sympathizers as
such but only those refusing to take the oath, for the result was the
same: "To make the enjoyment of a right dependent upon an im-
possible condition is equivalent to an absolute denial of the right
.... [I]f that. which cannot be accomplished by means looking
directly to the end, can be accomplished by indirect means, the
inhibition may be evaded at pleasure."43 Indeed, the oath require-
ment was worse than a direct disqualification of those who had
aided the rebellion; a direct disqualification would have occurred
only after a finding of guilt, while, as Alexander Hamilton had
said, oath provisions "'oblige the citizen to establish his own inno-
cence to avoid the penalty.' "44
Moreover, Field announced, the oath requirements were bills
of attainder proscribed by the same two sections. This term, he
stated without citation, was meant to embrace what the English
had called bills of pains and penalties as well as technical attain-
ders imposing death, and thus included any "legislative act which
inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.' '45 Historical examples
40 For a discussion of the test oath cases and reaction to them, see FAIRMAN, HISTORY,
supra note 4, at 240-48. A similar oath requirement for access to the courts was struck down
in Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1873), over the dissent of Justice Bradley.
41 Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320-22.
42 Id. at 327-28; Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377-78.
,1 Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 327, 329.
" Id. at 331.
45 Id. at 323. Field cited nothing for this important departure from the conceded com-
mon law meaning of the term, though Story, whom Field quoted a paragraph later for the
proposition that" '[b]ills of this sort'" had commonly been enacted in the heat of" 'violent
political excitements,'" had made the same unexplained equation, citing a conclusory dic-
tum of Marshall. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1338, at 211 (Boston 1833) (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 138 (1810) ("A'
bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may
do both.")). Professor Berger has castigated the Court for extending the term beyond its
established meaning, arguing plausibly enough that the presumption should be that the
Framers used common-law terms in their understood sense, particularly where, as with the
[51:131
1984] The Supreme Court: 1865-1873 141
were given of bills that had named classes of offenders rather than
individuals, and of bills that had imposed conditional punish-
ments.46 In effect, Field concluded, the oath provisions deprived
persons who had aided the rebellion of their professions without
judicial trial; and, once again, "[i]f the inhibition can be evaded by
the form of the enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law
was a vain and futile proceeding. '47 Finally, one of the petitioners
had received a Presidential pardon that freed him from punish-
ment for his Confederate activities; to remit him to the choice be-
tween perjury and disqualification, the Court concluded, was to
impair the effect of the pardon.'
As in Milligan, there were only five votes against the constitu-
tionality of the challenged measures, and this time the division was
on strict party lines. Justice Wayne, who had disagreed with the
majority in Milligan, joined his Democratic brethren in the oath
cases;49 Davis, who had differed from his fellow Republicans in the
earlier case, joined them in arguing that the oath provisions ought
to have been upheld. 0 Justice Miller's well-written dissent, cover-
ing both cases, made a variety of arguments, based upon the form
of the oath requirements, that seem, as Field said, to permit the
bills of attainder clause, a provision was adopted without debate. Berger, Bills of Attainder:
A Study of Amendment by the Court, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 355, 367, 380 (1978); see also
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 387 (Miller, J., dissenting) (complaining that the traditional
bill of attainder had provided for "corruption of the blood": "[tihe party attainted lost all
inheritable quality, and could neither receive nor transmit any property . . .by inheri-
tance."); cf. Currie I, supra note 3, at 866-75 (discussing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385
(1798)). But Berger offers no reason to explain why the Framers would have wanted to
distinguish sharply between death and other penalties inflicted by legislation without trial;
they expressed no antipathy to the death penalty as such, nor even to judicially imposed
corruption of blood, except in the specific case of treason against the United States. See
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; see also 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTIruTION 236 (2d ed. Wash., D.C. 1836) (1st ed.
Wash., D.C. 1830) (statement of Mr. Nicholas) (stressing that condemnation without trial
was the vice which the clause was meant to prevent).
,1 Cummings, 71 U.S (4 Wall.) at 323-24.
47 Id. at 325.
45 Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380-81. The Court also added, in a passage significant
for a much later controversy, see P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 136-48
(1978), that the President can pardon offenses "before legal proceedings are taken" as well
as after. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380; see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVErTIoN
OF 1787, at 426 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as CONVENTION RECORDS]:
Mr. L. Martin moved to insert the words "after conviction" after the words "re-
prieves and pardons".
Mr. Wilson objected that pardon before conviction might be necessary in order to
obtain the testimony of accomplices. . . . Mr. L. Martin withdrew his motion.
4' Wayne himself had been declared an "alien enemy" and his property confiscated by
his own state of Georgia during the war. See A. LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 189.
80 Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 382-99; Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 332.
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constitutional safeguards to be evaded at pleasure.51 Miller's essen-
tial contention, however, was more thought-provoking. The dis-
qualification of rebel sympathizers, he argued, was not punishment
at all, but only a prophylactic measure to protect the public in the
future. 2 Both Congress and the state had the right to make certain
that practitioners possessed "the proper qualifications for the dis-
charge of their duties," and "fidelity to the government under
which he lives" was "among the most essential qualifications which
should be required in a lawyer.""3 Since the laws under examina-
tion did not inflict punishment, Miller concluded, they were
neither ex post facto laws nor bills of attainder, and they did not
contradict the pardon.54
Miller's position cannot be lightly dismissed. Incompetent
medical treatment cannot retroactively be made a crime; but it
does not follow that it cannot be taken into account in determining
whether to allow a doctor to continue plying his trade, and one
may legitimately doubt the Framers meant to forbid its considera-
tion.55 If one agrees with Miller on this point, one is led to ask
whether the disqualification in question was intended as punish-
ment or as protection; Marshall had cautioned about the difficul-
ties of investigating legislative motives as early as 1810.56 Miller
accepted the challenge frankly if less than convincingly:
The history of the time when this statute was passed-the
darkest hour of our great struggle-the necessity for its exis-
51 Unlike a bill of attainder, said Miller, the laws in question did not identify any indi-
viduals who were to be punished; furthermore, the oath requirements were neither retro-
spective nor criminal. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 389-92 (dissenting opinion). Miller fur-
ther argued that attorneys could have been disqualified before the statutes were imposed on
the ground that disloyalty showed bad character. Id. at 393. That can hardly be a complete
apology for the statutes, which made disqualification mandatory and contained a very broad
list of disqualifying acts. See id. at 374-77. For contemporaneous criticism, see J. PoMERoY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 329 (1870), arguing
that what distinguished the oath requirements from bills of attainder was "the entire ab-
sence of the judicial element. There is no adjudication; no usurpation of the functions of
courts; no persons or class of persons, either by name or by description, are, by the mere
force and operation of the enactment, convicted of any crime existing or alleged."
52 Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 393-96.
53 Id. at 385.
54 Id. at 396-97. That retroactive punishment was the hallmark of an ex post facto law
had been established in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385 (1798), discussed in Currie I,
supra note 3, at 866-75.
15 Cf. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898) (upholding a ban on medical prac-
tice by convicted felons: "The State is not seeking to further punish a criminal, but only to
protect its citizens from physicians of bad character.").
16 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810); see Currie I, supra note 3, at
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tence, the humane character of the President who signed the
bill, and the face of the law itself, all show that it was purely a
qualification, exacted in self-defence, of all who took part in
administering the government in any of its departments, and
that it was not passed for the purpose of inflicting punish-
ment, however merited, for past offences.5"
Justice Field did not deny that past behavior might sometimes
be considered in determining qualifications, and he seemed to
agree that the legislative motive was determinative. The Missouri
oath, he said in Cummings, "was exacted, not from any notion that
the several acts designated indicated unfitness for the callings, but
because it was thought that the several acts deserved punishment
.. 58 Unlike Miller, he based his conclusion as to motive on
objective considerations:
It is evident from the nature of the pursuits and professions
of the parties, placed under disabilities by the constitution of
Missouri, that many of the acts, from the taint of which they
must purge themselves, have no possible relation to their
fitness for those pursuits and professions. There can be no
connection between the fact that Mr. Cummings entered or
left the State of Missouri to avoid enrolment or draft in the
military service of the United States and his fitness to teach
the doctrines or administer the sacraments of his church; nor
can a fact of this kind or the expression oft words of sympathy
with some of the persons drawn into the Rebellion constitute
any evidence of the unfitness of the attorney or counsellor to
practice his profession, or of the professor to teach the ordi-
nary branches of education, or of the want of business knowl-
edge or business capacity in the manager of a corporation, or
in any director or trustee.5 9
At least with respect to the priest in Cummings, Field seems
to have had the better of this argument, and Miller made no at-
tempt to show that past acts of disloyalty were relevant to the
qualifications of the clergy. Even Field was careful to point out
that neither case involved qualifications for public office,60 where
Miller's position becomes much more compelling: could the Fram-
ers really have meant to require admission into the councils of gov-
57 Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 396.
58 Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320.
59 Id. at 319-20.
6o Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378.
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ernment of people who had demonstrated their desire to sabotage
it?61 Miller placed his reliance on the intimate role of attorneys in
the governmental process: "They are, by the nature of their duties,
the moulders of public sentiment on questions of government, and
are every day engaged in aiding in the construction and enforce-
ment of the laws."'62 I think I side with Field on this one, but it
seems to me both sides argued ably for supportable positionses in a
case to which the Constitution gave no clear answer.64
II. RECONSTRUCTION
The Court made few friends among the dominant radical fac-
tion by striking down military trials and test oaths; there were
those who labelled Milligan and the oath cases "Dred Scott H
and III.''1 5 A series of cases that immediately followed appeared to
confront the Court with a still more explosive issue: the constitu-
tionality of the statutes providing for the fate of the former Con-
federate States. This set of cases produced several important rul-
ings respecting the powers of the federal courts, but some of the
central substantive issues remained unsettled. The Court tended to
treat the latter as hot potatoes, and the other branches of govern-
ment were only too willing to help see to it that they were never
completely resolved.6
The substantive issues were both fundamental and difficult.
Among other things, Congress had subordinated the elected gov-
ernments of ten Southern states to military authority7 and made
81 See Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951) (allowing inquiry into
past affiliations of applicants for municipal employment: "Past conduct may well relate to
present fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable relationship to present and future
trust."). After Wayne's death, the Court divided 4-4 over the validity of an oath of past
loyalty as a qualification for voting. See FAiRmAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 613-16; C.
SWISHER, supra note 4, at 154 n.21.
82 Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 386.
1S The similar question of citizenship requirements for bar admission was to divide a
much later Court. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (holding that Connecticut's exclu-
sion of aliens from the practice of law violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
" For an excellent discussion of later bill-of-attainder cases, see Note, The Bounds of
Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE
L.J. 330 (1962).
05 See FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, 216, 218, 219, 232, 236, 245; C. SWISHER, supra
note 4, at 152; 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, 430-32.
16 For general discussions of the Reconstruction cases, see FAMsAN, HISTORY, supra
note 4, chs. 8-10, 12; S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND REcONsTRUcTION PoLrrIcs chs. 5-6
(1968); 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, ch. 30.
87 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, §§ 1-3, 6, 14 Stat. 428, 428-29 (expired upon readmission
of rebel states to representation in Congress). The Act directed the military to keep the
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both black suffrage and ratification of the fourteenth amendment
conditions of admitting their representatives to Congress.6 s Not
only was it less than obvious what constitutional provisions might
support such legislation; on its face the statute seemed a gross
breach of Congress's constitutional obligation to guarantee each
state a republican form of government,69 a denial of the constitu-
tional right of representation in Congress,7 0 and a perversion of the
ratification provisions of article V.7 It also raised the article III
and jury-trial problems already identified in Ex parte Milligan.7 2
The Radical argument that the Southern states were no longer
part of the Union and thus could be treated as conquered territo-
peace and punish offenders and declared that "any civil governments" in those states were
"provisional only, and in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United
States." Id. § 6, 14 Stat. at 429. Tennessee, which was safely in Republican hands and had
ratified the fourteenth amendment, see FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 99, 132, 264
n.41, was not included. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 6, 14 Stat. 428, 429.
68 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429. A supplementary act, in response
to the difficulties experienced by loyalists attempting to vote, provided that military author-
ities conduct elections for the state constitutional conventions contemplated by the basic
reconstruction law. Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; see FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note
4, at 317-27 (criticizing Chief Justice Chase for stepping outside the judicial role to draft the
supplementary bill).
0' U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government. . . ."). President Johnson invoked this clause
and the clauses cited infra text accompanying notes 70-72, among others, in the message
accompanying his veto of the basic reconstruction bill, Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat.
428 (enacted over presidential veto). CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1729, 1731-32
(House), 1969, 1971-72 (Senate) (1867) [hereinafter cited as Johnson Veto Message], re-
printed in 6 J. RIcHARDSON, A COPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 498, 506-10 (1900).
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States .... The Senate
.. . shall be composed of two Senators from each State.. .... "); see also U.S. CONST. art. V
("[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.").
Moreover, to the extent that the question pertained to the "Qualifications" of Senators and
Representatives, but see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding "Qualifica-
tions" limited to the constitutional requirements of age, citizenship, and residence), it was
by no means clear that either House could surrender by statute its constitutional authority
as "Judge of the. . . Qualifications of its own Members," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. See A.
McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 677-78 (1935) (discussing
President Johnson's veto, on similar grounds, of a bill to "readmit" Arkansas to congres-
sional representation).
7 U.S. CONST. art. V (providing that amendments become law "when ratified by the
Legislatures [or Conventions] of three fourths of the several States"); see Johnson Veto
Message, supra note 69, at 1729, 1969, reprinted in 6 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 69, at 500
(arguing that the sole purpose of military rule was "as a means of coercing the people into
the adoption of principles and measures to which it is known that they are opposed, and
upon which they have an undeniable right to exercise their own judgment").
" See supra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
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ries73 was contrary to the premise on which the North had fought
the war. 4 The argument that military rule was a means to the es-
tablishment of truly republican government 5 involved, among
other things, a substantial redefinition of what "Republican"
meant, if not an actual play on the word.76 The most effective ar-
'1 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1865) (statement of Rep. Stevens)
(arguing that the war "broke all the ties" with the seceding states and that they had to
apply for admission as new states under article IV); id. at 24 (statement of Sen. Howard)
(describing the rebel states as "simply conquered communities, subjugated by the arms of
the United States-communities in which the right of self-government does not now exist");
id. at 31 (statement of Rep. Stevens) (objecting to the presentation of credentials on behalf
of Representatives from Tennessee: "The State of Tennessee is not known to this House nor
to Congress."). Compare the more subtle variant of this argument employed by Representa-
tives Shellabarger and Bingham, id. at 142-45, 156-59, and later espoused for the Court by
Chase, see infra text accompanying notes 180-96: though secession was unlawful, the states
had forfeited their rights. See FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 119, 123, 268, 268, 288-89
(describing views of Reps. Stevens and Shellabarger). The Act itself began by reciting in its
own justification that "no legal state governments ... now exist[]" in the rebel states. Act
of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 1, 14 Stat. 428, 428. As Fairman says, this was also a swipe at
Andrew Johnson's efforts at presidential reconstruction. FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at
298.
." See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1866) (statement of Sen. Nesmith):
Why should we involve ourselves in the paradoxical absurdity of denying the right of
secession, of fighting them for four years to enforce that denial, and when they admit
their failure by the last arbitrament, turn round and admit that they have accom-
plished their purpose, and are to-day outside the Union?
See also Johnson Veto Message, supra note 69, at 1730, 1970, reprinted in 6 J. RICHARDSON,
supra note 69, at 503-04. In his first inaugural address President Lincoln had argued that
secession was unconstitutional and had expressed his determination to enforce federal law
throughout the nation, Lincoln's First Inaugural Address, in 6 J. RICHARDSON, supra note
69, at 5, 7; in calling up troops he noted the need for measures "for the protection of the
National Constitution and the preservation of the National Union by the suppression of the
insurrectionary combinations now existing in several States for opposing the laws of the
Union," Proclamation of May 3, 1861, in 6 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 69, at 15; in address-
ing a special war session of Congress on July 4, 1861 he described his efforts "to prevent, if
possible, the consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union," Special Session
Message (July 4, 1861), in 6 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 69, at 20; in his first Annual Message
that December he emphasized that he had "thought it proper to keep the integrity of the
Union prominent as the primary object of the contest on our part," Message of December 3,
1861, in 6 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 69, at 54; and in the Emancipation Proclamation he
declared that "hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practi-
cally restoring the constitutional relation between the United States and each of the States
and the people thereof in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed,"
Proclamation of September 22, 1862, in 6 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 69, at 96.
7' See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 143, 145 (1866) (statement of Rep. Shel-
labarger) (suggesting that President Johnson had invoked the clause guaranteeing a republi-
can form of government as authority for his own earlier efforts at reconstruction in the teeth
of state constitutions). To create governments under the clause in the face of anarchy, how-
ever, as Johnson did, is not the same as to set aside governments already established.
7' Racial qualifications for voting had not been thought to subject Northern govern-
nents to congressional tinkering in the past. Only five states permitted blacks to vote at the
time of the war. See FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 96. Several states rejected proposals
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gument in favor of military rule was that put forward by Davis in
his dictum in Milligan:7 the relevant constitutional provisons were
subject to implicit exceptions for military necessity. Unlike Indi-
ana, the seceding states had taken arms against the nation, and a
measure of military occupation could be defended as inherent in
putting down the insurrection.78 Davis had also insisted, however,
that military rule could not be "continued after the courts are re-
instated, 7' and the provisions of the new law were to be applied
whether or not the civil tribunals were open.80
A. Mississippi v. Johnson
These troubling questions were first pressed upon the Court in
1867, when Mississippi filed an original action in the Supreme
Court to enjoin the President from enforcing the Reconstruction
Acts on the ground that they were unconstitutional. In a brief
opinion by Chief Justice Chase, the Court unanimously held it had
"no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance
of his official duties.""
The legal basis of this conclusion was left in obscurity. Since
Andrew Johnson was apparently a citizen of Tennessee," the case
for black suffrage between 1865 and 1867, see id. at 128 n.121, and Tennessee had been
readmitted to Congress without black voting, see id. at 264 n.41. Shellabarger's argument
was that a "[r]epublican" government meant one that was "loyal." CON(. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Seas. 145 (1866); see also A. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 70, at 643 ("A state govern-
ment, that is seized by 'rebels,' and made to do their will, can scarcely be considered a free
constitutional government. Technically, a state not in the possession of its loyal citizens is
not, constitutionally speaking, republican." (footnote omitted)). In the Constitutional Con-
vention the term "republican" had been contrasted with monarchy. See 1 CONVENTION
REcoRDs, supra note 48, at 206.
7 See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
78 This much was conceded by Senator Doolittle, one of the most articulate opponents
of reconstruction. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 271-72 (1866).
79 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 127.
80 Many thought Milligan spelled the doom of the provisions for military rule. Davis
himself did not, emphasizing that he had expressly recognized the power to authorize mili-
tary trials "in insurrectionary States." See S. KUTLER, supra note 66, at 67, 95. For an able
defense of military jurisdiction on the ground that it was "for Congress ... to determine
when the war has so far ended that this work [of restoring peaceful relations] can be safely
and successfully completed," see 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 59, 65 (1869). Professor Fairman, who
has given us a superb account of the intricate legislative history of the Reconstruction Acts,
FARmAN, HisTORy, supra note 4, chs. 3, 6, refrains from expressing a categorical judgment
on their constitutionality, but does seem to view the legislation on the whole as necessary
and desirable in light of Southern intransigence. See id. at 333-55, 591-98.
"1 Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1867).
92 See id. at 475 (reciting the allegations of the complaint); id. at 501 (assuming the
allegation of citizenship to be true). In the case that follows, Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 50 (1868), it was argued that federal officers "have no State citizenship," but have
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seemed to fall within article III's provisions for federal judicial au-
thority over "Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of
another State""3 and for original Supreme Court jurisdiction over
"Cases . . . in which a State shall be a Party. 8 4 As an original
matter, one might have argued with considerable force that the
general expressions of article III were not intended to override the
tradition of sovereign immunity,8s and that a suit to enjoin an of-
ficer from acting in his official capacity was in effect one against
the government;8s but the Court had already rejected the latter
proposition in the analogous state-officer case of Osborn v. Bank of
the United States.87 Chase disclaimed reliance on sovereign immu-
nity-expressly reserving the question whether in appropriate
cases a state might sue the United States itself.8
Much of the Johnson opinion was devoted to showing that
Marbury v. Madison"" was not precedent for the injunction re-
quested. Marshall had made clear in the earlier case that even a
cabinet officer could be subjected to a court order in some cases,
emphasizing that it was "not by the office of the person to whom
the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, that
the propriety . . . of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." 9
But Marbury, as Chase insisted, had expressly been limited to
compelling the performance of "ministerial" acts;91 Marshall had
specifically disavowed any authority "to inquire how the executive,
their "official residence" in the District of Columbia, id. at 53-54; see infra notes 104-27 and
accompanying text; the Court did not pick up the suggestion. Johnson's Tennessee citizen-
ship was used as an argument against the Radical theory of Reconstruction: if Tennessee
was no longer a state, he was not qualified to be President. See CoG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 118 (1865) (statement of Rep. Finck) (noting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, which re-
quires that the President be a citizen of the United States).
:3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 1.
s4 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 2; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-
75 (1803). The case would also appear to fall within the statutory grant of original Supreme
Court jurisdiction. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 78 ("[T]he Supreme Court
shall have . . . jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature . . . between a state and
citizens of other states, or aliens, in which. . . case it shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction.") (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976)). By modem standards Missis-
sippi's case also arose under federal law, but there was no statute at the time giving the trial
courts jurisdiction on that basis.
85 See Currie I, supra note 3, at 831-39 (discussing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793)).
a' See Currie II, supra note 3, at 697-99 (discussing Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)).
87 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
88 Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 501.
89 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
go Id. at 170; see Currie II, supra note 3, at 651-52 & n.43.
91 See Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 498-99.
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or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discre-
tion." 92 The enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts, Chase contin-
ued, involved the exercise of executive discretion: the President
was required to appoint military commanders, to provide the nec-
essary troops, and to supervise the commanders in carrying out
their duties.93 Judicial enforcement of such nonministerial duties,
said Chase, would in Marshall's words be "'an absurd and exces-
sive extravagance' "; the fact that the present suit sought not "to
enforce action by the Executive . . . but to restrain such action
under legislation alleged to be unconstitutional" did not take it
"out of the general principles which forbid judicial interference
with the exercise of Executive discretion. '94
This passage, whose essence would seem equally applicable to
suits against other government officers,95 wholly fails to persuade.
The distinction the Court brushed aside is crucial; the President
may have broad discretion in executing a valid law, but he has no
discretion to enforce an invalid one since he has no discretion to
violate the Constitution.
Less frivolous was the suggestion later in the opinion that the
President enjoyed a special immunity from suit by virtue of his
unique position: "The Congress is the legislative department of the
government; the President is the executive department. Neither
can be restrained in its action by the judicial department; though
the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to
its cognizance."9 " The consequences of such an injunction, Chase
continued, were so grave as to make plain its "impropriety":
If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe
that the court is without power to enforce its process. If, on
the other hand, the President complies with the order of the
court and refuses to execute the acts of Congress, is it not
clear that a collision may occur between the executive and leg-
islative departments of the government?9 7
Surely, Chase argued, Congress could not be enjoined from enact-
"2 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
"Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 499.
Id. (quoting and paraphrasing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170). For an approving
view of Chase's argument respecting discretion, see FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 381
n.57.
go Indeed, though the opinion notably failed to discuss the fact, the military com-
mander of the district including Mississippi had been named as an additional defendant.
See Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 475, 497.
"Id. at 500.
97 Id. at 500-01.
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ing an unconstitutional law, and how could an injunction against
presidential enforcement of such a law be distinguished? 98
Distinguishing the two cases is child's play: the Constitution
expressly immunizes members of Congress from being questioned
about their legislative actions "in any other Place";99 it makes no
comparable provision for the President. Moreover, the argument
that the Framers must have meant to avoid the risk of a direct
confrontation between the branches had already been blunted in
Marbury; conflict is likely when a Secretary of State is ordered
about as well. Now the negative inference from the congressional
immunity is not airtight, for that provision may have been inserted
out of an abundance of caution with no intention of foreclosing an
implicit Presidental immunity;100 and, as counsel argued, the indis-
pensability of the President makes his immunity argument far
stronger than that of his subordinates. 10 1 Thus, a respectable argu-
ment might have been made in favor of holding as a constitutional
matter that the President himself could not be enjoined,0 2 but
neither of Chase's arguments seems to fill the bill.103
98 Id. at 500.
99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
100 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 784 n.27, 786 n.31 (1982) (finding a presiden-
tial immunity from damage actions, apparently in the Constitution itself, and rejecting any
negative inference from the explicit congressional immunity); cf. Hans v. Lousiana, 134 U.S.
1 (1890) (finding an implication of state immunity from suit by its own citizens although the
eleventh amendment immunized it in express terms only from suits by citizens of other
states and by aliens).
101 Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 487-90 (argument by Attorney General Stanbery)
(With the President in jail for contempt, "there is not a law of the United States that can be
executed, not an officer that can be appointed or ... removed."); see also P. KURLAND,
supra note 48, at 131-36 (arguing on this basis for an implicit Presidential immunity against
criminal process); cf. 3 J. STORY, supra note 45, at 419 (President immune from arrest);
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim for Constitu-
tional Immunity at 15-20, In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled Dec. 5, 1972, No.
Civ. 73-965 (D. Md. 1973) (President Nixon's Justice Department's response to Vice Presi-
dent Agnew's defense of immunity-from criminal prosecution; arguing that only the Presi-
dent is indispensable, and only in his case would conviction be inconsistent with the consti-
tutional powers of prosecution and pardon), cited in D. CURRIu, FEDERAL COURTS-CASES &
MATERIALS 611 (3d ed. 1982).
101 The Court specifically reserved the question whether the President could be re-
quired "to perform a purely ministerial act .... or may be held amenable, in any case,
otherwise than by impeachment for crime." Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 498; see also
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (upholding an order to produce tapes without
even adverting to any argument of immunity from process); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700,
708-12 & n.53 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (ordering production of Watergate tapes, distinguishing
Johnson on its own flimsy "discretionary" ground).
103 See FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 382-83 (arguing that a contrary decision
would have "subverted" "something very fundamental to the constitutional system" and
praising the President for protecting his office at the cost of defending a law he bitterly
[51:131
The Supreme Court: 1865-1873
B. Georgia v. Stanton
Educated by Mississippi's misadventure, Georgia sought to en-
join not the President but his subordinates, the Secretary of War
and two of his generals, from enforcing the Reconstruction Act.
Once again the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was invoked,
and once again without success.10 4 The judgment was again unani-
mous; the Chief Justice, who disagreed with the Court's reasons,
declined to give any of his own.105
It is noteworthy that Justice Nelson, writing for the majority,
did not rely on Mississippi v. Johnson; apparently, despite some of
the language in that opinion and the fact that a subordinate officer
had been named as an additional defendant, 0 6 the Court had not
meant in the earlier case to hold that no officer could be enjoined
from enforcing an unconstitutional law. Rather, the case was
largely governed, in the eyes of the majority, by Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia,0 7 in which the Court had refused to entertain a suit by
the tribe to enjoin Georgia from exercising jurisdiction over its res-
ervation. As in Cherokee Nation, the complaint in Stanton called
"for the judgment of the court upon political questions, and, upon
rights, not of persons or property, but of a political character," and
thus did not "belong to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or
equity."'08
Nelson properly acknowledged that the language on which he
relied had been unnecessary to the result in Cherokee Nation,
since the Court had held the tribe not a "foreign State" entitled to
sue in the Supreme Court. 0 9 Nevertheless, the language had in
fact been used, 10 and on the "political" issue the cases were analo-
gous: both concerned the protection of an established government
against an arguably usurping rival. So, the reader will recall, had
opposed); S. KUTLER, supra note 66, at 96-97 (arguing that Johnson was correctly decided
and pointing out that none of the Justices supposedly hostile to Reconstruction dissented).
104 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868).
105 Id. at 77-78. For speculation as to Chase's position, see FAIMAN, HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 393.
1" See supra text accompanying notes 81-103 & note 94.
107 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
108 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 76, 77.
,09 Id. at 74 (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 29-30).
1 The bill requires us to control the legislature of Georgia, and to restrain the exertion
of its physical force. The propriety of such an interposition by the court may be well
questioned. It savours too much of the exercise of political power to be within the
proper province of the judicial department.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20.
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the famous decision in Luther v. Borden,"1 where, in refusing to
determine which of two contending factions was the legitimate
government of Rhode Island, Taney had suggested, among other
things, that the question was "political.""12 Predictably, counsel
opposing the suit in Stanton argued that Luther had placed the
constitutionality of Reconstruction beyond judicial ken by classify-
ing it as a "political question." 1 3
Although no earlier decision had established as a general prin-
ciple that questions of political import were nonjusticia-
ble-indeed, such recent decisions as Milligan, Cummings, and
Garland had demonstrated the contrary-a substantial argument
could have been made on the basis of precedent for a refusal ever
to consider the validity of Reconstruction. In the first place, the
guarantee of a republican form of government was a principal basis
both for justifying the statute and for attacking it," 4 and one of
the things clearly, if unnecessarily and unconvincingly, said in Lu-
ther was that the administration of this clause was entrusted ex-
clusively to the. other branches of government.115 Moreover, the
Prize Cases"6 might well have been called into service in support
of such a decision; for in upholding the President's blockade of
Southern ports during the war, the Court had flatly, if unnecessa-
rily, suggested that judges could never second-guess the responsi-
ble political authority as to the degree of force necessary to put
down the rebellion." 7
It is striking that neither the Prize Cases nor even Luther was
mentioned in the Stanton opinion. In fact, passages in the opinion
strongly suggest that the Court did not consider the case analogous
to Luther and did not mean to classify the issue of Reconstruction
as "political" in the sense in which that term is understood today.
First, in distinguishing the interstate boundary dispute the Court
1" 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
.12 Id. at 42, 46.
11 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 61 (argument by Mr. Stanbery).
114 See supra text accompanying notes 69-76.
11 See 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42-43; Currie V, supra note 3, at 714-19.
116 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
117 Whether the President ... has met with such armed hostile resistance ... as will
compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided
by him, and this court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political
department.. . to which this power was entrusted.
Id. at 670; see Currie V, supra note 3, at 738-40. Professor Fairman seems to view Stanton
as a political-question case and to think it rightly decided. FAiRMAN, HiSTORY, supra note 4,
at 393-96.
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had resolved in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,118 Nelson de-
scribed the question in the earlier case as "not a political question,
but one of property" having only an incidental effect on sover-
eignty, because the state "as the original and ultimate proprietor"
had the right of escheat over all lands within its borders.""9 While
this may trivialize the Rhode Island holding,1 20 the implication
seems to be that it was the fact that Georgia sued in its sovereign
capacity in Stanton, and not the nature of the underlying issue,
that made the case too "political" for judicial cognizance.12 1
This impression is strengthened by the penultimate paragraph
of the Stanton opinion, in which Nelson dismissed the importance
of an allegation that enforcement of the Reconstruction laws would
deprive the state of the use of its public buildings. The loss of
property, he wrote, had been alleged "only by way of showing one
of the grievances resulting from the threatened destruction of the
State,. . . not as a specific ground of relief"; protecting the state's
property would not justify the broad injunctive relief the state had
requested and "would have called for a very different bill" from
the one before the Court.12 2 This may represent an unjustifiably
hostile reading of the complaint,1 23 but it also suggests the trouble
was indeed not with the issue but with the party. The history of
the Cherokee litigation invoked by the Court is equally instructive:
after throwing out the tribe's suit with intimations that the case
was "political," the Court held the laws the tribe had challenged
unconstitutional in an action by a missionary whose personal rights
118 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838); see Currie V, supra note 3, at 718 n.150.
, Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 73.
110 The Court in Rhode Island never referred to the state's property interest; it relied
on the express provision in the Articles of Confederation for settlement of boundary dis-
putes and on the fact that the states had surrendered authority to settle them by either war
or treaty. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 723-31. The second argument applied equally to Stanton.
21, See also Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 76 (stressing that "the rights in danger...
must be rights of persons or property, not merely political rights" (emphasis added)).
122 Id. at 77.
,,1 See id. at 53 (declaring that the state had averred that it was the "owner of certain
real estate and buildings... (the State capitol,... and Executive mansion), and of other
real and personal property, exceeding in value $5,000,000; and that putting the acts of Con-
gress into execution. . . would deprive it of the possession and enjoyment of its property.").
For the more persuasive argument of counsel that the threat to state property was too con-
jectural to constitute a ripe controversy, see id. at 57-60 (argument by Mr. Stanbery).
In the absence of Justice Grier, the Court later divided equally along party lines and
refused Georgia permission to file an amended complaint more clearly alleging a property
right. See 2 C. WA~ N, supra note 4, at 463-64. Kutler views Nelson's reference to property
rights in Stanton as inviting an amended pleading and Grier's absence as crucial to avoiding
a test of Reconstruction. S. KUTLER, supra note 66, at 99, 113.
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were at stake.124 Thus, despite its misleading terminology, Stanton
seems to have held not that Reconstruction was a political issue
but, in accord with the distinction earlier drawn in the Wheeling
Bridge case,125 that the state had no standing to assert merely po-
litical interests;26 the door seemed to have been left open for an
attack by someone in the position of that missionary in the land of
the Cherokees. 127
C. Ex parte McCardle
Such a plaintiff was not long in presenting himself: an editor
imprisoned by the military authorities in Mississippi on charges of
having published "incendiary and libellous" articles 12  sought
habeas corpus on the ground that the Reconstruction Acts were
unconstitutional. When the circuit court denied relief, he appealed
to the Supreme Court as provided for in an 1867 statute.129 As if to
demonstrate that Stanton had not really been a political-question
case, the Court upheld its jurisdiction. ° While the case was pend-
ing, however, Congress repealed the provision under which the ap-
124 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see Currie II, supra note 3, at 721;
Currie III, supra note 3, at 953-56.
125 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (I), 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 559-62
(1852); see Currie IV, supra note 3, at 511-12.
126 For conflicting contemporaneous interpretations of the Stanton decision, see 2 C.
WARREN, supra note 4, at 472-73. The confusion between political questions and standing
was later perpetuated in the famous opinion in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), which, in denying a state standing to assert its sovereign interest in keeping Con-
gress within its powers, invoked Stanton and declared that the "question, as it is thus
presented, is political and not judicial in character." Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
127 For a real political-question case decided during the Chase period, see United States
v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866) (Miller, J.). There the Court deferred to the Execu-
tive as to whether the Chippewas were still to be treated as an Indian nation for purposes of
a statute forbiding liquor sales to certain Indians: "In reference to all matters of this kind, it
is the rule of this court to follow the action of the executive and other political departments
of the government, whose more special duty it is to determine such affairs." Id. at 419. The
statute in question seemed expressly to make the executive's position decisive, for it applied
to "any Indian under the charge of any Indian superintendent or Indian agent appointed by
the United States." Id. at 408. Miller's language went further, as it had to in order to sus-
tain the constitutionality of the act under the Indian commerce clause of article I, § 8, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8; see Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Limitations on State
Power, 1865-1873, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. (in press); since there was no doubt that the Chippe-
was were in fact "Indians," the loose terminology of the opinion need not be taken as carte
blanche for Congress to extend its powers by declaring all inhabitants of Kentucky, for ex-
ample, to be "Indians." Cf. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839) (defer-
ring to the executive on the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands).
28 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 508 (1869).
229 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 386 (repealed 1868).
130 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868) (Chase, C.J.). The political-question issue, however, was
not discussed; the argument concerned the interpretation of the provision for appeals.
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peal had been taken.13 1 Thereupon the Court dismissed without
dissent in an 1869 opinion by Chief Justice Chase.13 2
The opinion made it seem quite simple. Article III gave the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction of specified cases "with such
Exceptions ... as the Congress shall make,"13 s and Congress had
made an exception by repealing the jurisdictional provision.1 34 The
text of the Constitution makes this conclusion appear obvious; but
a moment's reflection should reveal that, if taken literally, the ex-
ceptions clause provides Congress with a ready means of frustrat-
ing Supreme Court review of its acts. If, as some passages in Mar-
bury v. Madison suggest, judicial review is merely an unavoidable
incident of the duty of judges to decide cases properly before
them,1 35 this conclusion is no cause for reexamining the statement
in McCardle. Yet other passages in Marbury, made persuasive by
explicit statements of Convention delegates and in The Federal-
ist, ' indicate that the Court thought the Framers had created ju-
dicial review as a means of enforcing the constitutional limits on
congressional power.13 7 On this view, to take the exceptions clause
literally would give Congress a means of avoiding a critical check
on its powers; even stronger than Marbury's presumption that the
Framers did not mean to leave Congress as sole judge of its own
powers is the presumption that they did not both create a judicial
check and render it avoidable at the whim of Congress. "' Thus, as
"' Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 (enacted over presidential veto)
(amending Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, and repealing Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14
Stat. 385, 386). For the history of this provision, courageously vetoed by President Johnson
during proceedings for his own impeachment, see FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 459-
69; 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 473-80.
133 For a thorough discussion of the legal issues, see Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Ex parte McCardle, 15 A2iz. L. REv. 229 (1973).
13 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
1- 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514 ("The power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdic-
tion of this court is given by express words.").
35 E.g., 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78 ("It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the
judicial department, to say what the law is.. . . So, if a law be in opposition to the constitu-
tion;. . . the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. .... ).
M For citations of supporting statements by Convention delegates and in The Federal-
ist, see Currie II, supra note 3, at 656 nn.69-70, 657 n.74, 658 n.77.
3 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176, 178 (arguing that the reason for a written constitution was
to limit legislative power and that to deny judicial review would give Congress "a practical
and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within
narrow limits"). For a discussion of the ambivalence of Marbury on this point, see Currie II,
supra note 3, at 660-61.
'3 President Johnson's message vetoing the repeal of the Court's jurisdiction argued
among other things that the deprivation of jurisdiction was "not in harmony with the spirit
and intention of the Constitution" because "it establishes a precedent which,.if followed,
may eventually sweep away every check on arbitrary and unconstitutional legislation."
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most modern commentators have concluded, 13 9 the issue was by no
means so simple as Chase made it appear in McCardle.40
On the other hand, the last paragraph of the opinion removes
the suspicion that the Court meant to establish that Congress's
power to make exceptions to its appellate jurisdiction was absolute:
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the re-
pealing act in question, that the whole appellate power of the
court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied. But this is an er-
ror. The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any
cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It
does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously
exercised. 41
What this cryptic passage meant was demonstrated soon
enough when another military prisoner sought Supreme Court re-
view of a similar denial of habeas corpus, not by appeal but by
petitions for habeas corpus and certiorari under the Judiciary Act
of 1789.12 In Ex parte Yerger,14 3 also in 1869, the Court in another
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2094, 2094 (Senate), 2165, 2165 (House) (1868), reprinted
in 6 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 69, at 646, 647.
139 See, e.g., authorities cited in Currie I, supra note 3, at 847-49 (discussing Wiscart v.
D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796)); authorities cited in Currie II, supra note 3, at 684-86
(discussing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)). Contra H. WECHSLER,
THE COURTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1965):
Federal courts . . . do not pass on constitutional questions because there is a special
function vested in them to enforce the Constitution or police the other agencies of
government. They do so rather for the reason that they must decide a litigated issue
that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and in doing so must give effect to the su-
preme law of the land.
140 The argument that the repealing act could not be applied to a pending case was
rejected summarily: precedent had established "that no judgment could be rendered in a
suit after the repeal of the act under which it was brought"; cases cited to the contrary were
distinguished as involving "the exercise of judicial power by the legislature, or of legislative
interference with courts in the exercising of continuing jurisdiction." 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at
514; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 132, at 245 (characterizing this "perfunctory discus-
sion" as "quite correct, given the fact that the case had not come to decision by the date the
Act became effective").
141 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
142 Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869) (holding that jurisdiction existed under
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1976))). For earlier decisions respecting review of judicial imprisonments under this provi-
sion, see Currie II, supra note 3, at 668-70 (discussing Ex parte Boilman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75 (1807)). In Yerger, Chase reaffirmed that this jurisdiction was appellate and thus consti-
tutional. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 97-102. In this connection he cast belated aspersions at Mar-
shall's conclusion in Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174, that Congress could not enlarge the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction:
If the question were a new one, it would, perhaps, deserve inquiry whether Con-
gress might not, under the power to make exceptions from this appellate jurisdiction,
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apparently unanimous Chase opinion upheld its jurisdiction. It was
true that the appellate power was "subject to exception and regula-
tion by Congress,' 1 44 but because a complete denial of Supreme
Court review "must greatly weaken the efficacy of the writ. . . and
seriously hinder the establishment of . . .uniformity in deciding
upon questions of personal rights,"'41 5 no such construction of the
statute would be adopted without a clearer statement by Congress;
as McCardle had said, the repealing statute took away only the
jurisdiction conferred in 1867, not that which had been confirmed
in 1789.146
At this point it appeared that a judicial test of Reconstruction
was imminent, but the military came to the rescue: Yerger was
turned over to the civilian authorities, and the case became
moot.147 Thus, despite an intervening decision yet to be dis-
cussed,148 the Reconstruction cases failed to produce a decision on
the validity of the provisions for military trials.
That all three branches were happy to avoid the confrontation
was plain enough. Not only had Congress deprived the Court of
jurisdiction over a pending case in a deliberate effort to prevent a
decision; it had been the scene of a number of far more drastic
proposals to insulate congressional actions from judicial
scrunity. 149 The Executive had done its part by releasing Yerger
when all else had failed. The Court's attitude is suggested by its
extend the original jurisdiction to other cases than those expressly enumerated in the
Constitution; and especially, in view of the constitutional guaranty of the writ of
habeas corpus, to cases arising upon petition for that writ.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 97.
143 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869). Professor Fairman says Miller dissented without opin-
ion, FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 583, but the official report does not say so.
144 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 102.
145 Id. at 103.
146 Id. at 103-05; cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 132, at 249 ("McCardle, in short, upheld
only an inessential exception to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, and did not curtail any of
its important authority."). Indeed, as Van Alstyne further argues, the repealing act made no
"Exception" at all: it merely regulated the manner in which jurisdiction should be exercised.
Id. at 250-54.
147 See FArmAN, HisTORY, supra note 4, at 584-91; 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 496-
97 & n.1.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 179-211 (discussing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 700 (1869)).
"' See S. KUTLER, supra note 66, at 64-88 (noting that various court-curbing measures
failed so long as there was no immediate danger to the Reconstruction Acts, but that the
Republican party was determined "to protect its reconstruction legislation" from the
Court); 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 466-72, 491-96 (discussing bills to require a two-thirds
vote to invalidate federal statutes, to deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over Recon-
struction Act cases, and to abolish judicial review entirely).
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transparently weak Johnson opinion, by its failure to assert con-
tinued jurisdiction in McCardle under the 1789 act on which it re-
lied in Yerger,150 and by its explicit decision, over the protest of
Grier and Field, to postpone action in McCardle pending passage
of the bill to take away its jurisdiction.15 At the same time, how-
ever, the Court studiously avoided giving a definitive opinion on
Congress's power to limit its jurisdiction, and in both respects it
seems to have been wise not to be bold. For the Court was fighting
for its future, and like Marshall in 'arbury,152 it did so tena-
ciously. With the Dred Scott debacle in the wings, and with a little
help from the other branches, the Court managed to tread the nar-
row path between rendering a judgment that might have been ig-
nored 153 and holding that Congress had the right to prevent judi-
cial review.
D. United States v. Klein
Indeed, before three years were out, the Court found a some-
what less explosive context in which to say that Congress's power
over the Court's appellate jurisdiction was not absolute after all.
Congress had authorized the owner of property that had fallen into
government hands during the war to recover the property's pro-
ceeds if he could demonstrate that he had not given aid or comfort
to the rebellion,1 54 and the Supreme Court had held in an earlier
case that a presidential pardon, by purging the owner of his of-
150 For discussion of the possibility of so relying, see Van Alstyne, supra note 132, at
245-48.
15' See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 480-84. Warren reprints Grier's eloquent state-
ment: "By the postponement of this case, we shall subject ourselves, whether justly or un-
justly, to the imputation that we have evaded the performance of a duty imposed on us by
the Constitution, and waited for Legislative interposition to supersede our action, and re-
lieve us from responsibility." Id. at 482 (quoting National Intelligencer, Mar. 31, Apr. 6,
1868; Chicago Republican, Apr. 3, 1868; Indianapolis Journal, Apr. 2, 3, 1868). But see FAIR-
MAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 479-80 (denying that the Court acted improperly). Fairman
notes that both the Democratic Senator Reverdy Johnson and a leading member of the bar
who had been an intimate of Chief Justice Taney had defended the Court from the charge
of undue delay. Id. at 468.
"' See Currie H, supra note 3, at 661.
153 Chase wrote to another judge that the Court would "doubtless" have held the provi-
sion for military trials unconstitutional had it taken jurisdiction in McCardle. See FAIRmAN,
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 494 (quoting Letter from Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase to Dis-
trict Judge Robert A. Hill (May 1, 1869)); see also Hughes, Salmon P. Chase: Chief Justice,
18 VAND. L. REv. 569, 595 (1965) (asserting that "the Court performed like an expert, if
aged, escape artist").
I" Act of Mar. 12, 1863, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820, 820, quoted in United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 131 (1872).
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fense, satisfied this burden of proof.115 Armed with a pardon, Klein
obtained a judgment from the Court of Claims for the value of cot-
ton taken by the government. While an appeal was pending, Con-
gress enacted a law providing that a pardon should be taken in-
stead as proof that the owner had aided the rebellion, and that
upon such proof the suit should be dismissed for want of jurisdic-
tion.156 Without dissent on the central issue, the Court in an im-
portant 1872 Chase opinion held the new provision
unconstitutional.1 57
"Undoubtedly," said Chase, "the legislature has complete con-
trol over the organization and existence of [the Court of Claims]
and may confer or withhold the right of appeal from its decisions";
if the statute "simply denied the right of appeal in a particular
class of cases, there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as
an exercise of the power of Congress to make 'such exceptions from
the appellate jurisdiction' as should seem to it expedient."' ,
"But," he continued, "the language of the proviso shows plainly
that it does not intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as
a means to an end. Its great and controlling purpose is to deny to
pardons granted by the President the effect which this court had
adjudged them to have."'59 To "dismiss the appeal" when a pardon
showed "that the judgment must be affirmed" would allow "one
party to the controversy to decide it in its own favor," and permit
Congress to "prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department
. . . in cases pending before it."' 60 Moreover, the statute was "lia-
ble to just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus
infringing the constitutional power of the Executive."' 1
Several distinct arguments appear in this jumble of reasoning,
not all of them convincing. It had been equally obvious in McCar-
dle that the denial of jurisdiction had been "a means to" the "end"
155 United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1870) (Chase, C.J.).
156 Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235, quoted in United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 133-34 (1872).
157 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-48 (1872). Miller and Bradley,
while arguing that the prior case was distinguishable because there the claimant had been
pardoned before his property was seized, agreed that Congress had no power "to prescribe
to the judiciary the effect to be given to an act of pardon or amnesty by the President." Id.
at 148. For a brief background of the case, see FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 840-46.
The most comprehensive legal analysis is Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal
Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. Rv.
1189.
158 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
'15 Id.
140 Id. at 146.
681 Id. at 147.
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of frustrating whatever substantive rights the applicant might have
had, and that by depriving the Court of jurisdiction the United
States had "decide[d]" the controversy "in its own favor." Yet the
Court in McCardle had blandly deferred to the congressional com-
mand with no suggestion that either legislative motive or the effect
on substantive rights was relevant. 16 2 As for "prescrib[ing] rules of
decision to the Judicial Department," that is what legislation is all
about, and McCardle itself had involved a "pending" case.16 3
Nevertheless, there were important differences between Klein
and McCardle. First, in Klein Congress had foreclosed all judicial
relief, while in McCardle it had left open not only the trial courts
but an alternate route to the Supreme Court itself; only in Klein
could it be argued that by closing all the courts Congress had effec-
tively denied a substantive constitutional right. 164 Moreover, the
law in McCardle had impartially excluded appeals by all habeas
corpus applicants; the law in Klein discriminated against those
claimants who had been pardoned. Since the Court had earlier sug-
gested that the purpose of the pardon was to place its beneficiary
on a par with those who had never aided the rebellion,0 5 the Court
could well view this discrimination as "impairing the effect" of the
pardon-just as the Court might view a denial of jurisdiction over
actions brought by Roman Catholics as an abridgement of their
free exercise of religion even if Congress is under no general duty
to provide a forum for the vindication of constitutional rights. 6
Thus it appears that the most Klein may even arguably have es-
tablished is that Congress may not selectively close all the courts
to claims of a class of litigants constitutionally entitled to equal
treatment on the merits.
There is, however, a third basis for distinguishing McCardle,
emphasized by the Court itself,1 1 7 that makes it questionable
whether Klein really established so much as the proposition just
stated. As Henry Hart saw it, Congress had not deprived the Court
16' See supra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
16 The right in question was the right conferred by the pardon as previously inter-
preted. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
165 United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1870).
16 See Van Alstyne, supra note 132, at 263; cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)
(forbidding political discrimination in government employment although the Constitution
gave no right to a government job). Similarly, Klein conceded that there need be no Court
of Claims at all, and no appeal from its decisions. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145; see Young,
supra note 157, at 1230-33 (arguing that the discriminatory nature of the proviso was the
reason sovereign immunity did not bar the action).
617 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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of power to decide the case; it had attempted "to tell the court how
to decide it" and indeed to do so "in accordance with a rule of law
independently unconstitutional."168 To Hart, Klein was like the
later case of Yakus v. United States,'"9 where Justice Rutledge,
with the apparent agreement of the Court, had drawn the following
distinction:
It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is en-
tirely another to confer it and direct that it be exercised in a
manner inconsistent with constitutional requirements or, what
in some instances may be the same thing, without regard to
them.. . . [W]henever the judicial power is called into play, it
is responsible directly to the fundamental law and no other
authority can intervene to force or authorize the judicial body
to disregard it. 170
I have argued above that whether Congress may withdraw ju-
risdiction of entire constitutional cases depends upon whether one
emphasizes those passages in Marbury v. Madison insisting that
judicial review is a fundamental check on other branches or those
describing it merely as a consequence of the judge's own obligation
not to violate the Constitution.1 71 Rutledge's position, however,
seems to follow even from the latter view. If the judge merely ref-
uses to hear a case he keeps his hands clean; if he inflicts punish-
ment on a defendant without listening to his constitutional objec-
tions, as Rutledge argued was the case in Yakus, he arguably
violates the Constitution.
The harder question was whether Klein really was a case in
which the Court was ordered to decide a case according to an un-
constitutional rule. If, as the Chief Justice at one point suggested,
the statute merely directed the Supreme Court "to dismiss the ap-
peal,' 72 the Yakus argument appears misplaced; the Court then
was simply forbidden to act.173 As Chase elsewhere recognized,
168 P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 316, 337 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER] (Hart's well-known discussion of congressional control of the distribution of ju-
dicial power); accord Young, supra note 157, at 1215-24 (giving a much fuller explanation).
181 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
170 Id. at 468 (dissenting opinion). The majority held there had been an adequate prior
opportunity for judicial review, which the defendant had forfeited.
171 See supra notes 135-38 and acompanying text.
172 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (emphasis added).
,73 A grant of jurisdiction to decide against but not in favor of a pardoned claimant
might have been vulnerable to the argument that the exercise of article HI's "judicial
Power" required the authority to decide either way if at all; but the statute in Klein avoided
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however, what the statute actually required was that the Court
"dismiss the cause"74-that is, as the government requested, that
it "remand" the case to the Court of Claims "with a mandate that
the same be dismissed for want of jurisdiction."'' 7 5 The Court was
thus told not to decline jurisdiction but to exercise it: to deprive
the claimant of an existing judgment in his favor if it found, in the
Court's words, "that the judgment must be affirmed''17  because of
the pardon. For Congress to have required the denial, on this basis,
of relief on the merits would have unconstitutionally impaired the
pardon. Although a contrary argument can be made,'7 7 there is
therefore a strong case for finding that Klein fell on the wrong side
of Justice Rutledge's principle that a court may not be ordered to
violate the Constitution. e
this objection, for it required dismissal on proof of a pardon without a decision on the mer-
its one way or the other.
17 80 U.S. (13 Wal.) at 146 (emphasis added).
175 Id. at 130. For a convincing demonstration that the government's position correctly
reflected the intentions of Congress, see Young, supra note 157, at 1203-09. See also CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3824 (1870) (statement of Senator Edmunds) ("[W]e say they
shall dismiss the case out of court for want of jurisdiction; not dismiss the appeal, but dis-
miss the case-everything."), quoted in Young, supra note 157, at 1208.
176 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
7 Viewing the situation from the point before Klein brought his suit in the Court of
Claims, the ultimate result was the same as if the courts had never been given jurisdiction
over claims by persons whose rebel activities had been pardoned; the Supreme Court was
directed merely to keep the lower court from giving Klein a judicial remedy. At the time
Congress restricted jurisdiction, however, Klein already had a favorable judgment, and the
Court was ordered to take it away because of the pardon.
178 A final possible basis for distinguishing Klein from McCardle was that Klein had
won in the lower court and McCardle had lost. In this light Chase's statement that the
United States was attempting to decide its own controversy, see supra note 160 and accom-
panying text, takes on added significance. On several prior occasions the Justices had said
that neither the Executive nor Congress could revise judicial decisions, see Gordon v. United
States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852);
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (C.C.D.N.Y., C.C.D. Pa., C.C.D.N.C. 1792), discussed in
Currie I, supra note 3, at 822-25, and one of the reasons given had been that to do so was to
exercise judicial power, see Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410. While the statute in
McCardle had left the lower court's denial of relief standing, that in Klein directed the
Supreme Court to set aside a decision already rendered; the rule that Congress itself could
not reverse the decision would be meaningless if Congress could order the Supreme Court to
do so. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (II), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856),
which Chase distinguished on the obscure basis that the statute in question had created
"new circumstances," 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47, does not detract from this argument;
Congress's decision to authorize a bridge over the Ohio River did not contradict the Court's
holding that earlier statutes had forbidden it. On the other hand, Congress had not directed
the Court to reverse Klein's case alone; it had enacted a general change in the law, and a
long line of cases had already established that such a law could be applied to cases on ap-
peal when it was enacted. E.g., The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801)
(Marshall, C.J.); see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 168, at 316 n.4; see also Young, supra
note 157, at 1238-40.
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In short, Klein does establish the welcome if unsurprising pro-
position that Congress's power to limit federal court jurisdiction,
like all its other powers, is subject to limitations found elsewhere
in the Constitution. McCardle was distinguishable, though the
Court was not entirely clear in saying why. Chase deserves some
credit for smelling a rat, even if he could not quite identify it; the
unsatisfying quality of his opinion may to a large extent be for-
given in view of the difficulty, after a hundred years of second-
guessing, of coming up with a wholly satisfactory explanation.
E. Texas v. White
At the outbreak of the war Texas owned federal bonds, which,
according to state law, it could transfer only over the signature of
the Governor. After secession the rebel legislature repealed the sig-
nature requirement, and the bonds were sold. When the war was
over, the partly reconstructed state brought an action in the Su-
preme Court to recover the bonds, and in an 1869 Chase opinion it
prevailed. 179
There was a threshold problem: the Supreme Court had juris-
diction only if the suit was between "a State and Citizens of an-
other State,"180 and Texas had purported to secede from the
Union.18' Thus the Chief Justice found it necessary to hold that
secession was unconstitutional. He did so in a single paragraph: the
Articles of Confederation had declared the Union "perpetual"; the
preamble to the 1789 Constitution had declared that the new
Union was to be even "more perfect"; and "[w]hat can be indissol-
uble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not?"'8 2
This hardly seems an adequate treatment of an issue on which
reasonable people had differed to the point of civil war.18 3 It was
179 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869). The case and its intricate aftermath
are extensively described in FAIRMAN, HIsToRY, supra note 4, at 619-76.
180 U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, para. 1. Since Texas had brought an original action in the
Supreme Court, the Court had jurisdiction only if the suit was one "in which a State [was] a
Party ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 1; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
173-75 (1803); see also supra notes 83-84.
181 See 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 722-24.
182 Id. at 724-25; see also White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 649-52 (1872) (Swayne,
J.) (reaffirming that Georgia had never left the Union and holding therefore that she was
forbidden to impair contractual obligations notwithstanding her attempted secession). The
White v. Hart opinion added nothing to the reasoning of Texas v. White, nor did it cite the
Texas decision.
'83 For an argument in favor of the right of secession by a highly respected northern
observer, see W. RAWLE, A Viaw OF THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
295-310 (2d ed. Philadelphia 1829) (st ed. Philadelphia 1825). We pass quickly over the
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an act of considerable audacity to treat the mere statement of pur-
pose in the preamble as if, contrary to its natural reading, it im-
posed legally binding limitations on the states.184 As for the Arti-
cles, they had been superseded by the new Constitution. Indeed
this very supersession, as well as the arguments that accompanied
it, furnished an embarrassing argument in favor of secession. The
Convention had deliberately chosen to ignore the procedure pre-
scribed in the Articles for their own amendment, 8 5 invoking a va-
riety of justifications ranging from popular sovereignty and the
right of revolution188 to the position that a breach of the Articles
by one state dissolved the obligations of the others.18 7 At least the
first two arguments were still available in 1861,188 but Chase did
objection that, so far as the mere text was concerned, the reason the earlier union was less
"perfect" might have been precisely that it was perpetual, for that could (and should) have
been refuted by a little history: it was the weakness of the central government under the
Articles of Confederation, not its permanence, that gave rise to the call for revision. See,
e.g., 1 CONVENTmION RECORDS, supra note 48, at 18-27 (argument of Edmund Randolph in
laying his plan before the Convention, spelling out the weakness of the Articles, finding
them "totally inadequate to the peace, safety and security of the confederation," and declar-
ing "the absolute necessity of a more energetic government"); see also 2 J. ELLIOT, supra
note 45, at 185-90 (statement of Mr. Ellsworth), 208-15 (statement of Mr. Livingston), 430-
31 (statement of Mr. Wilson); 3 id. at 26-27 (statement of Gov. Randolph), 226 (statement
of Mr. Marshall); 4 id. at 253 (statement of Mr. Pinckney); 1 J. STORY, supra note 45, at
226-51.
I" One might as persuasively argue that the preamble's recitation of the purpose to
"promote the general Welfare" empowered Congress, in the teeth of the enumeration of
limited powers emphasized by the tenth amendment and confirmed in McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), to take any steps appropriate to achieving that goal.
See 1 J. STORY, supra note 45, at 445 ("The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge
the powers confided to the general government .... Its true office is to expound the na-
ture, and extent, and application of the powers actually conferred by the constitution, and
not substantively to create them.").
'65 And the articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State,
and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be
made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United
States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State.
ARTIcLEs OF CONFEDERATION art. 13. Contrast U.S. CONST. art. VII ("The Ratification of the
Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution
between the States so ratifying .... )).
166 See, e.g., 1 CONVENTION REcoRDs, supra note 48, at 262 (statement of Gov. Ran-
dolph) ("There are great seasons when persons with limited powers are justified in exceed-
ing them . . . ."); 2 id. at 469 (statement of Mr. Wilson) ("We must go to the original
powers of Society, The House on fire must be extinguished, without a scrupulous regard to
ordinary rights."). Compare the insistence in the Declaration of Independence on the "Right
of the People to alter or to abolish" a bad government. The Declaration of Independence
para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
'8 E.g., 1 CONVENTION RacoRDs, supra note 48, at 314 (statement of Mr. Madison).
188 Madison, who used the breach argument himself in 1787, see supra note 187, argued
that ratification by conventions rather than by state legislatures would make that argument
inapplicable to the new Constitution. 1 CONVENTION REcoRDs, supra note 48, at 122-23; see
[51:131
The Supreme Court: 1865-1873
not stop to rebut any of them.
The Confederacy itself, as the Court was later to hold,189 was
easy to strike down if the states had not legally seceded; article I,
section ten expressly forbids the states to enter into any "Alliance,
or Confederation." 190 If secession was lawful, however, the Confed-
eracy was not an alliance among states, and the secession question
was harder. The best argument was based upon an important
change of language from the Articles to the Constitution: while the
former were a "firm league of friendship" among "sovereign[]"
states,191 the latter was "the supreme Law of the Land."192 The
Articles may have been a treaty voidable upon breach, but the
"more perfect" Constitution was not; and Texas had unilaterally
declared inoperative within its borders what the Constitution said
was supreme law, "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."193 Even this argument was
not conclusive, since the whole question was whether Texas was
still part of the "Land"; while it is scarcely the most natural infer-
ence, it would not have been wholly inconsistent for the Framers to
require that states respect federal law only so long as they chose to
remain in the Union. The interesting fact is that the supremacy
clause argument was not made.194
Surprisingly, Chase went on to hold that the illegality of seces-
sion did not answer the jurisdictional objection. Though Texas had
not left the Union, it had forfeited its right to sue:
All admit that, during this condition of civil war, the rights of
the State as a member, and of her people as citizens of the
Union, were suspended. The government and the citizens of
the State, refusing to recognize their constitutional obliga-
tions, assumed the character of enemies, and incurred the
also infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
"' Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 182 (1878) (Field, J.).
'so U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
191 ARTIcLEs OF CONFEDERATION arts. 2, 3.
192 U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
193 Id.
194 It had, however, been made by Justice Story in his Commentaries. 1 J. STORY, supra
note 45, § 340, at 308-09, § 352, at 318-22. Professor Fairman finds the issue simple: "The
Constitution ... allowed for amendment but not for dissolution; it did not speak to the
situation where secession in arms had been attempted." FAIRMAN, HIsTORY, supra note 4, at
641 (footnote omitted). This appears to turn the Constitution on its head: the tenth amend-
ment reserves to the states all powers not prohibited by the Constitution. Madison's argu-
ment that ratification by conventions would make the Union permanent, on the other hand,
see supra note 188, strongly supports the Court's conclusion; it was not cited.
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consequences of rebellion." 5
Thus Chase, and the majority of the Court with him, accepted
without supporting argument the standard Radical view of a one-
sided secession: the Southern states had annihilated their rights
but not their obligations."9 ' This was a pretty shaky thesis; if
Texas was still a state, article III seemed to give it the right to sue.
The Court's finding of forfeiture meant that Texas's right to
sue depended upon the legitimacy of the provisional governments
set up with federal approval after the defeat of the rebellion. "[S]o
long as the war continued," wrote Chase, the President had power
"as commander-in-chief" to "institute temporary governments
within insurgent districts" or to "take measures . .. for the resto-
ration of State government faithful to the Union"--"employing,
however, . . . only such means and agents as were authorized by
constitutional laws." 197 Whether presidential Reconstruction "was,
in all respects, warranted by the Constitution," it was unnecessary
to decide;' s it was "primarily" up to Congress to restore constitu-
tional government through article IV's guarantee of "a republican
government"; 99 and Congress had recognized Texas's civil govern-
ment as a "provisional" one in the Reconstruction Acts
themselves. 200
For this proposition Chase relied on precedent: his predeces-
sor's famous statement in Luther v. Borden20' that " 'it rests with
Congress to decide what government is the established one in a
State.' "202 The quoted statement was not only of questionable per-
suasiveness, as I have elsewhere argued;103 it was also unnecessary
to the result in Luther. The plaintiff had not relied on the guaran-
tee clause, and the Court ultimately held that the federal court
195 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 727.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
197 74 U.S. (7 Wal.) at 730; see also Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506-07
(1871) (Swayne, J.) (upholding Congress's authority under its powers "to declare war ...
and ... suppress insurrections" to suspend civil statutes of limitations in state courts dur-
ing the time the war precluded suit: "[The power] carries with it inherently the power to
guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have
arisen from its rise and progress."); The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129, 131-33 (1870)
(Chase, C.J.) (upholding the President's military authority to establish a civil tribunal in
reoccupied Louisiana during the war).
198 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 729.
"I Id. at 730 (quoting Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (Taney, C.J.)).
200 Id. at 730-31.
201 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (Taney, C.J.).
20 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 730 (quoting Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42
(Taney, C.J.)).
202 See Currie V, supra note 3, at 718-19.
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must defer to state courts in determining the question because it
was a matter of state law.2 0 Even the dicta of Luther, moreover,
did not clearly point to Chase's conclusion. At one point Taney
had seemed to say that the guarantee clause issue was for each
House of Congress to decide in determining whether to seat elected
senators and representatives;20 5 and, as three dissenters argued in
Texas v. White, those Houses had suggested that Texas was not a
state by denying it representation. 208 Furthermore, even the pas-
sage invoked by Chase seemed to cut against his decision to deter-
mine the legality of secession and forfeiture of the right to sue: if
Congress alone had power to decide whether Texas had a legiti-
mate state government, the Court had no business reaching either
question. Finally, Chase's ultimate holding that Congress had
given Texas authority to sue made it unnecessary to discuss
whether the state had earlier lost that right; Chase seemed eager to
take the occasion to affirm as much of standard Radical doctrine as
he could.207
Having upheld jurisdiction, the Court held Texas could get its
bonds back; the rebel act authorizing sale without the governor's
signature was invalid because it had been passed "in furtherance
or support of rebellion . *.". .",0 Grier alone protested: if Texas
had not left the Union, it had the power to repeal its own legisla-
tion.209 This plausible position was made more convincing by the
singular failure of the majority to identify what provision of the
Constitution the repealing act offended; unlike secession, the sale
of state property did not on its face contradict federal law. Chase
seems to have viewed the raising of funds for rebellious purposes
as inseparable from secession itself;210 but this conclusion, like so
'0 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 40.
$O Id. at 42.
2" 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 738 (Grier, Swayne, and Miller, JJ.).
207 Grier's dissent, id. at 737-39, substantially joined on the jurisdictional issue by
Swayne and Miller, id. at 741, was no more satisfying. Professing to find the question of
statehood one of "fact" rather than law, Grier noted that Texas was not represented in
Congress, and invoked Marshall's holding that the District of Columbia was not a "State"
for article H purposes because it did not elect congressmen. Id. at 737, 738 (quoting
Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 445, 452 (1805)). But the District of Columbia was not
entitled to representation under the plain terms of the Constitution. If Texas had no right
to secede, it seemed still to have the right to elect congressmen; Grier seemed to be saying
that Congress could deny a state the right to sue by unconstitutionally excluding it from its
own halls.
- 1 Id. at 732-34.
209 Id. at 739-40.
2'0 See id. at 726 ("[Tjhe ordinance of secession ... and all the acts of her legislature
intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null."). Easier than Texas v.
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much else in his opinion, would have benefited from further
explication. 1'
In Texas v. White the Court went out of its way to embrace
the Radical position that secession and all acts that served it were
illegal, that the seceding states had nevertheless forfeited their
rights, and that Congress could determine under the guarantee
clause how they were to be governed. It did so essentially by fiat,
without serious consideration of the opposing arguments.
III. FINANCIAL MEASURES
As it had in the area of federal and state relations, the Civil
White were cases holding void acts of the central government of the Confederate States,
since the Confederacy itself was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Hickman v. Jones, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 197, 200-01 (1870) (Swayne, J.) (allowing damages against those responsible for trying
the plaintiff under Confederate authority for "treason" against the Confederacy); United
States v. Keehler, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 83, 86-87 (1870) (Miller, J.) (holding it no defense to an
action against a postmaster who had unlawfully paid out government funds that he had
done so in conformity with an act of the Confederate Congress); supra note 182 and accom-
panying text.
On the other hand, the Court managed to avoid massive disruptions by acknowledging
acts of the Confederacy not directly in furtherance of the rebellion on the basis that the
Confederacy was a "de facto" government. Thus in Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1
(1869) (Chase, C. J.), the Court enforced a contractual obligation to pay for land in Confed-
erate money, and in Delmas v. Insurance Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661 (1872) (Miller, J.), it
held such a contract had been unconstitutionally impaired. See also Mauran v. Insurance
Co., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 1 (1868) (Nelson, J.) (holding a seizure by the rebels to be a "capture"
within an exception to a marine insurance policy). What is interesting are the dicta in Texas
v. White suggesting that it was the same "de facto" doctrine that would justify the Court in
upholding acts of the rebel state governments that were "necessary to peace and good or-
der" and not "in furtherance or support of the rebellion." 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 733 (citing
"acts sanctioning and protecting marriage and the domestic relations, governing the course
of descents, regulating the conveyance and transfer of property, . . . and providing remedies
for injuries to person and estate"). For reasons never adequately stated but probably related
to its holding that Texas had forfeited its right to sue, the Court seemed to think that by
unlawfully attempting to secede the state government had lost all its powers. But in Horn v.
Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570, 580 (1873) (Field, J.), where the issue was the validity of a
wartime Alabama probate decree, the Court said:
[T]he acts of the several States in their individual capacities,.., so far as they did not
impair ... the supremacy of the National authority,... are.., to be treated as valid
and binding. The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds
of society, or do away with civil government, or the regular administration of the laws.
21 That actions supporting the rebellion were punishable as treason, U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 3, and suppressible as insurrection, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, does not prove them uncon-
stitutional, and the provision forbidding states to "engage in War," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
had an exception for cases of actual or threatened invasion. A strong argument could have
been made that the exception did not apply to an "invasion" by federal troops seeking to
enforce federal law, but Chase did not make it. For extensive criticism of the nonconstitu-
tional aspects of the decision, some of which were promptly repudiated in other cases, see
FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 643-62, accusing Chase of "want of rigor in analysis," id.
at 648.
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War produced a revolution in the area of finance. As usual, the
Supreme Court was asked to hold everything that was new uncon-
stitutional; after one important setback, the Court confirmed the
new order.
A. Federal Taxes
The first confrontation came in the field of federal taxation.
Before the war, tariffs on imported goods had provided the princi-
pal source of federal revenue. To meet the extraordinary expenses
of the emergency, Congress not only raised tariffs but imposed a
variety of internal taxes, including one on the income of insurance
companies and on the amounts they had insured.1 2 In the 1869
case of Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule,215 the Court rejected the
argument that this tax was a direct one required by article I to be
apportioned among the states according to population.214 Justice
Swayne's unsatisfying opinion carefully selected for quotation or
unattributed paraphrase those relatively unconvincing passages
from the carriage tax case, Hylton v. United States,2 5 that favored
his conclusion (the dicta that perhaps only land and poll taxes
were direct 2 6 and the wishful argument that direct taxes meant
those that could be fairly apportioned 217 ) and ignored the more
persuasive argument of Justice Paterson that the carriage tax had
been an indirect effort to reach what an income tax reached di-
rectly-the income itself.21 8
212 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 105, 120, 13 Stat. 223, 276, 283-84, amended by Act
of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 98; see J. SCHUCKERS, supra note 4, at 222-23; Dam, The
Legal Tender Cases, 1981 Sup. CT. Rav. 367, 371.
213 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1869).
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States... according to their respective numbers. . . ."); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9 ("No Capitation, or other direct, Tax, shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the
Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.").
216 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
216 Id. at 175 (Chase, J.), 177 (Paterson, J.), 183 (Iredell, J.); the first two were quoted
by Swayne, Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 444-45, with references to the approving views of
several prominent commentators.
217 Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 174 (Chase, J.), 179-80 (Paterson, J.), 181-83 (Iredell, J.),
restated in Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 446 (Swayne, J.).
'1 Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 180-81. Paterson had quoted Adam Smith's explanation:
"[T]he state, not knowing how to tax directly and proportionally the revenue of its subjects,
endeavors to tax it indirectly, by taxing their expense. . . ." Id. at 180 (quoting A. SuxmH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NAIONs 692 (J. McCulloch ed.
Uondon 1838) (1st ed. London 1776)). Counsel for the taxpayer in Soule not only invoked
Smith; he stated an alternative interpretation that would also make sense of the term "di-
rect" while arguably outlawing the income tax: "The ordinary test of the difference between
direct and indirect taxes, is whether the tax falls ultimately on the tax-payer, or whether,
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More novel and more complicated was Veazie Bank v.
Fenno,219 an 1869 Chase decision upholding a prohibitive federal
tax on state bank notes 220 against a variety of constitutional objec-
tions. The first issue was easy after Soule: on the basis of the tests
employed in that case, this tax was not direct.221 More troublesome
was the argument, advanced by Nelson and Davis in dissent,222
that the tax in effect was one on the states that had created the
banks, and that it was thus forbidden by an implicit immunity
analogous to the immunity of federal banks to state taxes recog-
nized in McCulloch v. Maryland.225 It was true that McCulloch
had described this immunity in dictum as a one-way street: the
supremacy clause operated only in favor of federal immunity, and
through the tax-payer, it falls ultimately on the consumer." 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 437-38, 440
(argument of Mr. Wills). For criticism of the Hylton opinions and a discussion of the mean-
ing of "direct" taxes, see Currie I, supra note 3, at 853-60.
For a discussion of Farrington v. Saunders, an unreported 1871 case in which the Court
divided 4-4 over the validity of the cotton tax imposed by the Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, §
1, 14 Stat. 98, 98, see FA1RMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 883-95. Field, Nelson, and Clifford
thought the cotton tax direct, probably on the basis of Paterson's suggestion in Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) at 177, that a tax on "the immediate product of land" might be considered one
on the land itself. FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 890. Davis, Nelson, and Clifford
thought it a tax on exports forbidden by section 10 of article I of the Constitution, appar-
ently because (as argued by counsel) so much cotton was exported. FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 884. Chase was absent. Counsel had also made the interesting argument that if the
tax was not direct it violated the requirement that indirect taxes be "uniform throughout
the United States," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, because all cotton was grown in the South. FAIR-
MAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 885 (argument of former Justice Curtis). Compare a similar
argument made by Justice Nelson in the commerce clause context. See Currie, supra note
127 (in press).
219 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869); see FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 711-12; Dam,
supra note 212, at 374-76.
220 Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, cl. 2, 14 Stat. 98, 146 (repealed 1870). Similar notes
had earlier been unsuccessfully attacked on the ground that they were bills of credit, which
the states were forbidden by § 10 of article I to issue. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 257 (1837); sde Currie IV, supra note 3, at 477-80. The tax on them was part of
Chase's pet project as Treasury Secretary to replace them with a federal currency based in
large part on national bank notes. See J. SCHUCKERS, supra note 4, at 240-41, 296-97; Dam,
supra note 212, at 375.
21 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 540-47 (citing Soule and the passages it had quoted from Hyl-
ton). After pointing out that Congress had never imposed direct taxes on anything but land
and slaves, the Court concluded:
[I]t may further be taken as established upon the testimony of Paterson, that the
words direct taxes, as used in the Constitution, comprehended only capitation taxes,
and taxes on land, and perhaps taxes on personal property by general valuation and
assessment of the various descriptions possessed within the several States.
Id. at 546.
22 Id. at 554-56.
:" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431-32 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[T]he power to tax involves
the power to destroy"; to allow states to tax federal activities would make the federal gov-
ernment "dependent on the States.").
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the states were protected by their representation in Congress.2
Yet the case for state immunity was arguably stronger than that
for federal immunity in McCulloch: precisely because the
supremacy clause worked only one way, the states could not pro-
tect themselves by legislation as Congress could protect its
instrumentalities. 25
The Court had already recognized this argument by holding in
Kentucky v. Dennison22 6 that Congress could not impose duties on
state officers under the extradition clause; there seemed no reason
not to apply the same reasoning to federal taxes, and the Court
was soon to do SO. 22 7 Indeed, the Court in Veazie Bank conceded
the principle, 228 but insisted that the tax was on the banks' con-
tracts and not on the process of governing.229 This distinction
would equally have sustained the state tax in McCulloch. A better
basis of decision might have been that (in apparent contrast to the
national bank in McCulloch) "[tlhere was nothing in the case
showing that [Veazie Bank] sustained any relation to the State as
a financial agent, or that its authority to issue notes was conferred
or exercised with any special reference to other than private
interests. '23 0
The final and most interesting argument in Veazie Bank was
that the measure was a tax in form only; in substance it was an ill-
disguised attempt to forbid the state banks to issue notes at all.
Though there seems little doubt that this characterization was cor-
" Id. at 428, 435.
"' See Currie m, supra note 3, at 936-37. The power of Congress to exempt federal
securities from state taxation had in fact just been confirmed in aziother Chase opinion. See
Bank v. Supervisors, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 26, 30-31 (1869); infra note 247.
210 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107-10 (1861); see Currie V, supra note 3, at 705-07.
22 See Currie, supra note 127 (in press) (discussing Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
113 (1871)).
28 It may be admitted that the reserved rights of the States, such as the right to pass
laws, to give effect to laws through executive action, to administer justice through the
courts, and to employ all necessary agencies for legitimate purposes of State govern-
ment, are not proper subjects of the taxing power of Congress.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 547.
229 Id. at 547-48.
230 This passage appears in the reporter's statement of the case, id. at 535, but not in
the opinion itself. The argument that even the national bank had essentially served private
interests had been made in McCulloch and ignored. See Currie MI, supra note 3, at 936
n.353, and authorities cited therein. The decision in Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 257 (1837), see supra note 220, that state bank notes were not those of the state
for purposes of the bills of credit clause also lent some support to the decision that the tax
in Veazie Bank was not one on the state. See 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 552 (Nelson, J.,
dissenting).
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rect, 31 the Court piously said that the oppressiveness of a tax was
no ground for holding it unconstitutional.232 This was hardly an
answer. Notwithstanding the reluctance Marshall had expressed to
investigate legislative motive in Fletcher v. Peck,133 he had cau-
tioned in McCulloch that Congress could not invoke its powers as
a "pretext" for interfering with matters reserved to the states.3 4
As later Justices not known for judicial activism were to insist, a
total refusal to investigate the motive or effect of a tax would make
a mockery of the careful enumeration of limited federal powers
recognized in McCulloch: Congress could effectively regulate any-
thing it pleased simply by calling the price of action a tax instead
of a penalty.3 3 Yet Madison had noted in the Convention that
taxes were often properly laid for ulterior reasons, 2 3 and Justice
Robert Jackson later said with much force that it was impossible
to formulate a tax law without making decisions about social or
economic priorities.37 Moreover, the First Congress, whose views
have often and for good reason been given special deference,238 had
imposed discriminatory taxes to encourage American shipping.23 9
Thus, the question of motive in taxation scarcely seems to admit of
such a simple answer as Chase offered in Veazie Bank.
2 See 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 556 (Nelson, J., dissenting):
IT]he purpose is scarcely concealed, in the opinion of the court, namely, to encourage
the National banks. It is sufficient to add, that the burden of the tax, while it has
encouraged these banks, has proved fatal to those of the States; and, if we are at liberty
to judge of the purpose of an act, from the consequences that have followed, it is not,
perhaps, going too far to say, that these consequences were intended.
See also Dam, supra note 212, at 375 ("The power to tax was used with unprecedented
effectiveness to destroy.").
:32 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 548.
" 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810); see Currie III, supra note 3, at 890-91.
2s4 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. Also ignored in Veazie Bank was the apparent conclusion
of the whole Court shortly before that the question in the test-oath cases was whether or not
the legislature's intention had been to punish. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying
text.
'a See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing from the upholding of a tax on the business of accepting wagers); Child Labor Tax Case,
259 U.S. 20, 36-38 (1922) (Taft, C.J., joined by Holmes, J.) (striking down a prohibitive tax
on goods manufactured by child labor); cf. 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARiES ON AMRICAN LAw 393-
94 n.e (4th ed. New York 1840) (1st ed. New York 1826) (arguing that taxes could be laid
only for the purposes specified in article I, § 8: "to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare of the United States").
236 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 48, at 276 (discussing the clause forbidding the
Senate to initiate revenue measures); see also 2 J. STORY, supra note 45, §§ 956-70, at 430-40
(defending the validity of taxes laid for purposes other than collection of revenue).
237 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 35 (1953) (concurring opinion).
2" See, e.g., Currie II, supra note 3, at 681-82 (discussing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)); Currie III, supra note 3, at 928 (discussing McCulloch).
139 Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27 (repealed 1970).
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In any event, Chase unnecessarily went on to announce an al-
ternative ground that made it easier for later Justices to explain
away his apparent conclusion that motive could not be investi-
gated:2 40 it was irrelevant, he said, whether Congress had at-
tempted to outlaw state bank notes under the guise of taxing them,
because Congress could have outlawed them directly.24 1 Congress,
wrote Chase, had undoubted authority "to provide a circulation of
coin," and it was "settled by ... uniform practice . . . and by re-
peated decisions, that Congress may constitutionally authorize the
emission of bills of credit.' '242 Having this power to "provide a cur-
rency,. . . Congress may. . . secure the benefit of it to the people
by appropriate legislation. '24 3 Just as it had denied the status of
legal tender to foreign coins and outlawed counterfeiting, Congress
might therefore "restrain .. . the circulation as money of any
notes not issued under its own authority. Without this power, in-
deed, its attempts to secure a sound and uniform currency for the
country must be futile. '"2 4
All of this seems more than a little glib and was certainly gen-
erous in its interpretation of congressional power. The only explicit
authority referred to was the power to coin money,' 45 and, as the
next important financial controversy was to show, there was con-
siderable doubt whether that power even authorized the issuance
of paper money, 46 much less empowered Congress to forbid state
bank notes. Neither the constitutional source of the alleged power
to issue bills of credit nor the alleged decisions upholding it were
cited. 47 The legislative precedent of the ban on counterfeit coins
was of little use, since that had been authorized explicitly by arti-
cle I,248 and the necessity of outlawing state notes in order to "se-
cure a sound and uniform currency," which was the heart of the
argument, was stated as a bald conclusion. No allusion was made
240 See, e.g., Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 41-42 (1922).
241 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 548-49.
242 Id. at 548.
241 Id. at 549.
244 Id. The dissenters did not discuss this issue.
"I" Id. at 548-49 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
24, See infra text accompanying notes 254-319 (discussing the legal tender litigation).
247 The Supreme Court decision closest to being on point was Bank v. Supervisors, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 26 (1869), upholding Congress's power to immunize paper money from state
taxation, where Chase had said it was "not seriously questioned" in argument that the notes
had been issued "as a means to ends entirely within the constitutional power of the govern-
ment." Id. at 29.
24, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . [t]o provide for the
Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States ....").
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to the several Supreme Court precedents that would have been
helpful: neither to McCulloch, with its broad test for necessity and
propriety and its finding that the national bank was constitu-
tional,249 nor to the broad conclusions reached by the Taney court
under the commerce clause, 50 nor to United States v. Marigold,51
which had upheld the power to outlaw the mere passing of coun-
terfeit coins, nor to Chase's own decision in the preceding Term
that Congress had power to immunize paper money from state tax-
ation.252 As in Texas v. White,5 3 the Chief Justice seems to have
been at pains to run roughshod over all possible objections and
little concerned to give persuasive reasons for his debatable
conclusions.
B. Legal Tender
An even greater controversy over wartime financial policy
reached the Court the same Term in Hepburn v. Griswold.2 ' In a
notorious split decision,55 the Court, speaking through Chase, held
that Congress had no power to make its paper money legal tender.
The contrast with the latitudinarian approach of Veazie Bank was
141 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see Currie III, supra note 3, at 928-34.
150 See, e.g., Foster v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 244 (1859) (upholding licensing of
lighters confined to Mobile harbor on the ground that they were servicing vessels engaged in
interstate and foreign commerce); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838)
(upholding power to punish theft of shipwrecked goods); Currie IV, supra note 3, at 497-
513.
251 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850); see Currie IV, supra note 3, at 511 n.275.
252 [W]e think it clearly within the discretion of Congress to determine whether, in view
of all the circumstances attending the issue of the notes, their usefulness, as a means of
carrying on the government, would be enhanced by exemption from taxation; and
within the constitutional power of Congress, having resolved the question of usefulness
affirmatively, to provide by laws for such exemption.
Bank v. Supervisors, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 26, 30-31 (1869). Nothing had been cited in support
of this conclusion either.
252 See supra notes 179-211 and accompanying text.
24 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
255 Miller, Swayne, and Davis dissented; Nelson, Clifford, and Field joined Chase's
opinion. For discussion of the lamentable circumstances surrounding the vacillating vote of
the aged Grier, who was said to agree with the majority that the Act in question was invalid
as applied to debts incurred before its passage, id. at 626, and of his resignation under
pressure from his brethren before the decision was actually announced from the bench, see
FAIRMAN, HIsToRY, supra note 4, at 716-19 (doubting that Grier really believed the law un-
constitutional and chastising Chase for proceeding to decision with such a questionable ma-
jority). See also id. at 739 (quoting from a memorandum by Justice Miller: 'We do not say
he did not agree to the opinion. We only ask, of what value was his concurrence, and of what
value is the judgment under such circumstances?' "); FAmRMAN, MiLLER, supra note 4, at 164-
66 (describing how Grier came to change his vote).
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striking, and Veazie Bank was not even cited. 56
In 1860, when only gold and silver coins were legal tender for
debts, Hepburn gave Griswold a note promising to pay 11,250 "dol-
lars." Two years later Congress authorized the issuance of paper
money and declared it "a legal tender in payment of all debts, pub-
lic and private. ' 257 Hepburn tendered payment in this paper
money, which had depreciated in value;258 the Supreme Court held
Griswold did not have to accept it. The statute making paper
money legal tender, wrote Chase-who as Lincoln's Secretary of
Treasury had supported the measure259-was "not a means appro-
priate . . . to carry into effect any express power vested in Con-
gress"; it was "inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution";
and it was "prohibited by the Constitution" as well. 260
The opinion begins by reaffirming the power of judicial review,
"' Professor Fairman's History devotes a hundred pages to discussion of this contro-
versy, clearly disapproving of much about Chase's conduct but commenting only obliquely
on the constitutional merits. FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 677-775. An excellent early
analysis of the legal issues is Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REv. 73 (1887), reprinted in
J. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 60-90 (1908). For an enlightening explanation of the financial is-
sues underlying the legislation, see Dam, supra note 212.
257 Act of Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 33, § 1, 12 Stat. 345, 345. In earlier cases the Court had
construed the Act narrowly so as to avoid the constitutional question. See Bronson v. Rodes,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 229, 249-50 (1869) (Chase, C.J.) (holding over Miller's dissent that a con-
tractual obligation in "'dollars payable in gold and silver coin'" was not a "debt" within the
tender provision but "an agreement to deliver a certain weight of standard gold"); Lane
County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 77 (1869) (Chase, J.) (holding, in part because of a
separate statutory reference to federal "taxes," that the "debts" for which the notes were
made tender did not include state taxes, and adding that "it is not easy to see upon what
principle the national legislature can interfere with the exercise" of state power to tax (em-
phasis added)). The tender issue had also been expressly reserved in Bank v. Supervisors, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 26, 29-30 (1869), where the notes were held immune from state taxation. In
Hepburn itself, Chase found the statutory terms too clear to permit holding them applicable
only to future contracts, despite the principle that laws "are not to receive an interpretation
which conflicts with acknowledged principles of justice and equity, if another sense, conso-
nant with those principles, can be given to them." 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 606-10. Grier alone
disagreed. See id. at 626.
211 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 608.
259 See FAIRMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 684-87. In Hepburn, Chase adverted ob-
liquely to his change of heart, contrasting "patriotic" acquiescence by "many" "amid the
tumult of the late civil war" with "considerate reflection" "under the influence of the calmer
time." 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 625-26. Later, when his earlier advocacy was used against him by
a new majority, he acknowledged it expressly (though in the third person) and said bravely
enough that "[e]xamination and reflection under more propitious circumstances have satis-
fied him that this opinion was erroneous ... " Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457,
576 (1871) (dissenting opinion).
210 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 625. Though the only question before the Court was retroactive
application of the law, the first of Chase's arguments seemed strongly to imply that the Act
could not be applied prospectively either; he so argued in the later Legal Tender Cases, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 582-86 (1871) (dissenting opinion).
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repeating Marshall's arguments, in best Marshall style, without at-
tribution." 1 It also intones, again without citation-and, the result
suggests, without conviction-the familiar canon that "acts of Con-
gress must be regarded as constitutional, unless clearly shown to
be otherwise. 26 2 Moreover, said Chase in echo of McCulloch v.
Maryland,6 3 the necessary and proper clause confirmed that Con-
gress had "extensive" powers "incidental" to "the exercise of the
powers expressly granted," and "a very large part, if not the largest
part," of federal functions "have been performed in the exercise of
powers thus implied. ' 264 Neither the necessary and proper clause
nor the tenth amendment, he persuasively emphasized, "is to be
taken as restricting any exercise of power fairly warranted by legit-
imate derivation from one of the enumerated or express pow-
ers." 265 The test of whether a law went beyond congressional au-
thority, he concluded, was that laid down in McCulloch: " 'Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.' "2166
Applying this test, Chase first concluded that paper tender
was not an "appropriate" means of carrying out any of Congress's
enumerated powers. The power to "coin money," he said, quite
without elaboration, applied only to "the precious metals. '267 This
brusque treatment may strike the modern reader as surprisingly
literal; the Court has not taken the copyright clause's reference to
"Writing, 26 8 for example, as limited to the written word.269
261 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 610-12; see Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
262 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 610.
26- 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407-12 (1819).
264 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 613.
266 Id. at 613-14. Both clauses, wrote Chase, were "admonitory," leaving no room to
doubt either that Congress had incidental powers or that those powers were limited. Id. at
614. Marshall had said as much in McCulloch as well. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406, 420-21.
Contrast the later statement in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), properly repudi-
ated in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941), that an act forbidding inter-
state traffic in goods made by child labor "in a two-fold sense is repugnant to the Constitu-
tion. It not only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over commerce but also
exerts a power as to a purely local matter to which the federal authority does not extend."
247 U.S. at 276.
266 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 614 (quoting 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). For discussion of this
test, see Currie III, supra note 3, at 928-34.
267 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 615-16.
26 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
268 See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (Miller, J.)
(holding photographs protected).
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Throughout the legal tender litigation, however, proponents of the
paper money placed little emphasis on the coinage clause; while we
may have wished for a better explanation, it seems that the obvi-
ous differences between coins and promises, illustrated elsewhere
in the opinion,2 70 were understood at the time to have made the
choice of the term "coin" a deliberately narrow one. 7' But if this
was so, a respectable argument could have been made that the
coinage clause by negative implication forbade Congress to issue
paper money. 2 Though later opinions did invoke this contention
against the law,2 73 they did not give it especial prominence;274 and
Chase, who made a variety of arguments, did not mention it at
a l
2 7 5
270 See 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 608 (observing that the value of tender notes "sank in July,
1864, to the rate of two dollars and eighty-five cents for a dollar in gold").
M' Miller conceded in dissent that the coinage provision did not itself support making
paper tender. Id. at 627.
271 See the argument of O.W. Holmes, Jr., in a note to 1 J. KENT, COMMETNRIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 272 n.1 (12th ed. 1873) (lst ed. New York 1826): "[I]f the Constitution says
expressly that Congress shall have power to make metallic legal tender, how can it be taken
to say by implication that Congress shall have power to make paper money legal tender?"
Holmes had first made this argument in 4 AM. L. REv. 768 (1870). See FAIRMAN, HisTORY,
supra note 4, at 715.
2 7 E.g., Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 624 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting);
see infra note 318.
2'74 In McCulloch Marshall had rejected the parallel argument that by authorizing Con-
gress to make certain acts criminal the Framers had implicitly forbidden it to criminalize
others, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 416-17, and the Court had confirmed Marshall's conclusion in
United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850) (upholding a ban on the passing of
counterfeit coins). The analogy is not decisive, since the Framers may have had different
reasons for including the coinage and counterfeiting clauses; but the Court nonetheless
made effective use of it when Hepburn was overruled. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 457, 536-37, 544-47 (1871). For further arguments against the negative implication,
see Thayer, supra note 256, at 83-88, reprinted in J. THAYER, supra note 256, at 73-79,
observing that the coinage clause was thought neither to preclude ordinary bills of credit
nor to make coins legal tender.
1'5 Nor did Chase, like his dissenting brethren Field and Clifford in the case overruling
Hepburn, Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 587, 635 (1871), see infra note 318,
rely on the Convention's rejection of a proposal (taken from article 9 of the Articles of
Confederation) to authorize Congress explicitly to "emit bills on the credit of the United
States," 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 48, at 182. Professor Dam argues that, by omit-
ting express authority, the Framers meant to prohibit bills of credit as contrasted with
promissory notes, just as they had in the case of the states in article I, § 10. See Dam, supra
note 212, at 382-90; Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 431-32 (1830). In support of this
argument, Dam relies largely on a private note by Madison explaining to posterity (but not
to his colleagues) his own vote. "[S]triking out the words," wrote Madison, "would not dis-
able the Govt [sic] from the use of public notes as far as they could be safe & proper; &
would only cut off the pretext for a paper currency and particularly for making the bills a
tender," 2 CONVNTION RECORDS, supra note 48, at 310 note (emphasis added). Madison,
however, spoke only for himself. As Professor Thayer long ago pointed out, Thayer, supra
note 256, at 74-78, reprinted in J. THAYER, supra note 256, at 61-67, though Mason and
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The argument that Chase did take seriously was that paper
tender was necessary and proper to the exercise of the war powers,
the commerce power, and the power to borrow money.2 76 No one
doubted, he conceded, that Congress could issue ordinary bills of
credit as paper money to facilitate the exercise of these powers,
though unfortunately he did not bother to spell out why.2 77 But the
fact that at the same time other notes that were not legal tender
"circulated freely and without discount" was strong "evidence that
all the useful purposes of the notes would have been fully an-
swered without making them a legal tender for pre-existing
debts. ' 278 In any event, it was by no means clear "that any appre-
ciable advantage is gained by compelling creditors to receive them
in satisfaction of pre-existing debts, ' 279 as in Hepburn; and
furthermore,
whatever benefit is possible is far more than outweighed by
the losses of property, the derangement of business, the fluc-
tuations of currency and values, and the increase of prices to
the people and the government, and the long train of evils
apparently others agreed with Madison that Congress "would not have the power unless it
were expressed," Gorham of Massachusetts ("Ghorum" in Madison's notes) argued "for
striking out, without inserting any prohibition," so as not to encourage Congress to act
lightly; Gorham believed that "[tihe power as far as it will be necessary or safe, is involved
in that of borrowing." 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 48, at 309. Thus, despite Profes-
sor Dam's persuasive reading of Madison's own position, Justice Bradley seems right that
the language was 'struck out with diverse views of members," Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 457, 559 (1871) (concurring opinion), and that, like the Framers' rejection of an
explicit power of incorporation, id., the omission does not demonstrate that the Convention
as a whole thought it was prohibiting what it declined to authorize expressly-even if such
an intention would be the equivalent of an express prohibition. See FAIRMAN, MmLER, supra
note 4, at 159 ("[T]his was not a vote to forbid the issue of notes, since it was concurred in
by several members who had made it clear that they were opposed to an absolute prohibi-
tion."). Moreover, as both Thayer and Dam pointed out, the argument from the omitted
proposal proves too much: what was stricken was authority to issue bills of credit at all, not
merely to make them legal tender. See Dam, supra note 212, at 389-90; Thayer, supra note
256, at 78-80, reprinted in J. THAYER, supra note 256, at 67-69. Congress had been issuing
bills with general acquiescence since the War of 1812, and neither Chase nor any other
Justice questioned their constitutionality. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 616; supra notes 242-43
and accompanying text (discussing Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869)).
278 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 616-17.
277 Id. at 616, 619 (adding without citation that the Court had recently so held). The
reference was apparently to Bank v. Supervisors, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 26 (1869), and to Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869), see supra text accompanying notes 246-47,
where the question had not been argued. See also Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457, 574-75 (1871) (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that Veazie Bank had based the
authority to issue bills on the borrowing power, with additional currency powers derived
from the commerce clause).
278 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 620.
279 Id. at 621 (emphasis added).
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which flow from the use of irredeemable paper money.280
This was a clever argument, and not wholly unconvincing; if
the tender provision did not facilitate government operations, it
could hardly be "necessary" even in the loose sense employed by
Marshall."' On closer scrutiny, however, Chase's argument begins
to fall apart. In the first place, he was judging the legal-tender law
in hindsight; he seemed to be saying that every law that failed to
accomplish its purpose also fell outside the necessary and proper
clause. One would have thought the question was whether the mea-
sure appeared necessary at the time of its adoption, 2" and on that
basis one might think that Congress was within its rights in ex-
pecting that people would be likely to accept paper money at a
smaller discount if their creditors would have to accept it too.283
Besides, Chase admitted that his evidence of the inutility of tender
was somewhat flawed: since the nontender notes that had retained
a value comparable to that of tender notes had been exchangeable
for them, one may be skeptical of his easy conclusion that they
derived their desirability essentially from the government's prom-
ise to receive them in satisfaction of public dues.28 4 More funda-
280 Id. For discussion of the adverse effects of the tender legislation, see FAiRMAN, His-
TORY, supra note 4, at 690-91.
181 Indeed, Chase came close to saying that tender did not even meet the still more
lenient test that Marshall had employed in the earlier case of United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805) ("Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be em-
powered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by
the constitution."), since a measure that is wholly useless is not even "conducive" to the
exercise of a granted power.
2'2 See FAIRMAN, MILLER, supra note 4, at 162 ("[I]t is not good constitutional law to
say that a measure is invalid because we see it worked out badly."). For a contemporaneous
criticism on the same ground, see 4 AM. L. Rsv. 586, 606-09 (1870).
283 See 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 634 (Miller, J., dissenting); see also Legal Tender Cases, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 543 (1871) (Strong, J.). This argument, moreover, seems as applicable to
old debts as to new ones: the more creditors are required to accept paper money, the more
likely it is that its owner can realize its full value. See Thayer, supra note 256, at 94, re-
printed in J. THAYER, supra note 256, at 87 ("To make the currency do the usual office of
money more effectually and fully, is legitimate regulation of the currency."). Professor Dam,
however, is dubious: "[N]ot every new use increases value. . . . [It] is, of course, an empiri-
cal question." Dam, supra note 212, at 393.
1,4 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 620. Professor Dam, who finds Chase's conclusion (as later re-
peated by Field, Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 647 (1871) (dissenting opin-
ion)) "compelling," does not advert to this fact. Dam supra note 212, at 393-94, 409. Profes-
sor Dam persuasively argues, however, that the real necessity for making the notes tender
was to protect the banks from having to pay out gold or keep gold in reserve-and thus was
to prevent the collapse of the banks. Id. at 405-08; see also id. at 410 ("Collapse of the big
city banks, which were in early 1862 the Treasury's indispensable link with the financial
markets, might well have led to the collapse of the Union. Or at least a Court sitting in 1862
might reasonably have so feared.").
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mentally, the Chief Justice's assumption that the test was whether
the same goal could have been accomplished without paper
tender2 5 seemed to contradict Marshall's insistence that a measure
could be "necessary" without being indispensable;2 8 as Miller
noted in dissent,287 there was nothing in McCulloch to suggest that
Congress must choose the least intrusive means..28  Finally, in bal-
ancing the utility of the tender provision against its adverse effects
on property and financial stability, Chase, without authority or ex-
planation, added a brand new and debatable dimension to the
Marshall calculus he purported to be applying: he seems to have
read the requirement that a law be "proper" to demand that its
benefits outweigh its costs-in the eyes, of course, of the judges.28 9
Having amply if unconvincingly disposed of the case on the
ground that paper tender for existing debts was not an "appropri-
ate" means of effectuating any express congressional power, Chase
imitated Marshall once again by going on to find two additional
grounds for his conclusions. The first, once more purporting to ap-
ply the passage from McCulloch already quoted,290 was that the
tender law offended the "spirit" of the Constitution. One of the
"cardinal principles" of that document, Chase wrote without citing
the preamble in which the phrase appeared, was "the establish-
ment of justice. '29 1 What was "just," in turn, was indicated in part
by the clause forbidding the states to impair the obligation of con-
tracts.9 2 Although that clause did not itself limit the authority of
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 278.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819) (contrasting the provi-
sion in article I, § 10 forbidding all state import duties not "absolutely necessary" for the
execution of inspection laws); id. at 424 (rejecting the relevance of Congress's option of rely-
ing on state banks); cf. Dam, supra note 212, at 411 ("[E]ven if the bonds could have been
sold directly to the public for specie, Congress was not required to use this constitutionally
less offensive method . . ").
287 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 628-31.
288 It is also striking that Chase nowhere attempted to compare the necessity of the
tender law with that of other measures that had been upheld in the past; as Miller argued, it
is not obvious that tender was appreciably less necessary to the powers invoked than was
either the national bank or the tax on state notes that Chase himself had voted to uphold
the same term in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
28I See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text. Without citing it, Chase properly
rejected Marshall's position that it was for Congress alone to determine "the degree of...
necessity" of any measure "really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the
government," McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423, a view which threatened to eliminate
judicial review of any measure adopted under the necessary and proper clause. Hepburn, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) at 617-18.
280 See supra text accompanying note 266.
281 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 622.
12 Id. at 623 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10).
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Congress, its spirit was meant to "pervade the entire body of legis-
lation"; "a law not made in pursuance of an express power, which
necessarily and in its direct operation impairs the obligation of
contracts, is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution. ' 29 3
The same was true of the fifth amendment ban on the taking of
property for public use without just compensation, which did apply
to Congress: "If such property cannot be taken for the benefit of
all,. . it is difficult to understand how it can be so taken for the
benefit of a part without violating the spirit of the prohibition.
219 4
One is tempted to protest with Miller 295 that the contract
clause, like the legal-tender clause of the same section, applied
only to the stat6s, that it was not even clear that property had
been "taken" in the constitutional sense, and that "justice" was an
open-ended notion that would allow judges to pass upon the wis-
dom of every law. One is tempted to add that the preamble is at
best a guide to interpreting clauses with teeth in them, and that
the supremacy clause requires acceptance of statutes that comply
with the provisions of the Constitution without regard to its
"spirit. '2 6 Yet Chase's position does not seem to have been that
the Court may disregard all unjust laws.297 He explicitly purported
to apply Marshall's test for measures adopted under the necessary
and proper clause, and in explaining why a federal bankruptcy law
would not offend his principles he expressly distinguished laws
passed under Congress's express powers.298 In effect, as he had ear-
lier construed the word "proper" to require that laws incidental to
express powers be utilitarian,9 9 so he now construed it to reqkire
2' Id.
" Id. at 623-24.
2,5 Id. at 627, 637-38 (dissenting opinion).
2" See Currie I, supra note 3, at 871-73 (discussing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386
(1798)); Currie III, supra note 3, at 892-94 (discussing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87 (1810)). Moreover, if one were free to look at the "spirit" rather than the text of the
governing provisions, one might as convincingly argue that the purpose of the enumerated
powers in article I was to authorize Congress, as Randolph had proposed, 1 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 48, at 21, to deal with all subjects of national concern, which surely
included deciding what would be legal tender. Yet the choice of specific provisions over
general ones seems to have been deliberate. See also Thayer, supra note 256, at 89-91, re-
printed in J. THAYER, supra note 256, at 80-83.
297 Speaking in dissent in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), when
Hepburn was overruled, see infra note 318, Field did invoke the natural-law utterances of
his predecessors, apparently as a limitation on any exercise of congressional power. Chase
invoked them too in a separate dissent in the later case, but apparently for a more limited
purpose. See infra note 301.
293 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 623.
"' See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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that they also be just. Moreover, he qualified even that relatively
modest conclusion by professing to find the content of "justice"
not in general notions of propriety but in analogous constitutional
provisions. Finally, Chase appeared superficially to have impres-
sive support for his restrictive reading of the term "proper," for
Marshall had said in the famous McCulloch passage quoted above
that a law was not necessary and proper unless it satisfied the
"spirit" as well as the terms of the Constitution.300
Nevertheless, there are grave objections to Chase's reasoning.
First, by failing to tie his arguments to the words "necessary and
proper," Chase left the door open for a later argument that his
decision had established the general power of the courts to invali-
date unjust legislation, and he nowhere said "justice" was to be
301 fufound solely in analogous provisions. More fundamentally, he
never explained why he thought "proper" should for the first time
be construed, as it need not have been, to mean "just." Though
Marshall had encouraged such an interpretation by his reference to
the "spirit" of the Constitution, he had expressly (if not very con-
vincingly) argued that "proper" was not a second and more strin-
gent requirement but served instead to ameliorate the degree of
necessity that might otherwise have been required. 2 The context
suggests that what Marshall meant by his "spirit" reference was
that the necessary and proper clause was part of an enumeration
designed to give Congress only limited authority and thus should
not be read so expansively as to defeat the purpose of the enumer-
ation itself.3 03 It was a substantial step beyond that position for
Chase to equate "proper" with conformity to the purposes under-
lying distinct provisions that the Framers had expressly made in-
applicable to the case before him.
Beyond the foregoing argument, Chase found yet a third
300 See supra text accompanying note 266.
301 The next Term, in dissent, he defined "justice" by reference to the natural-law mus-
ings of Marshall and of the earlier Justice Chase. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457, 581-82 (1871) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
302 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418-19. Yet another possibility is that "proper"
meant "not contrary to limitations found in other provisions of this Constitution," such as
the ex post facto clause. "Proper" is a peculiarly vague and uninformative word with which
to express that idea, and to modern eyes this interpretation makes the word redundant.
Moreover, if the Framers thought this point needed explicit statement, one would expect
them to have added "proper" to other grants of congressional power (e.g., the commerce
clause) as well.
303 See Currie III, supra note 3, at 932. As Miller pointed out in dissent, legal tender
could scarcely be considered "an invasion of the rights reserved to the States," since it was
"among the subjects of legislation forbidden to the States" by article I, § 10. 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) at 627.
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ground on which to declare the tender law unconstitutional: it de-
prived creditors of their property without due process of law, in
violation of the fifth amendment.30' This was the second time this
thesis had surfaced in the Supreme Court. The first was in the
Dred Scott case, on which Chase understandably neglected to rely;
there Chief Justice Taney, apparently speaking for less than a ma-
jority of the Justices, 0 5 had said quite without explanation that for
Congress to provide that a man lost his property in slaves by
bringing them across a territorial line "could hardly be dignified
with the name of due process of law."30 Chase did no better in
Hepburn: contracts were property, the loss of value was "direct
and inevitable," and, "whatever may be the operation of" the
tender act, "due process of law makes no part of it. 3 0 7 What due
process meant he made no effort to say,308 and it was no clearer
then than it had been at the time of Dred Scott-except for the
uncited precedent itself-that the clause was meant to outlaw sub-
stantively arbitrary legislation. 0 9 Furthermore, as with the ques-
tion of the taking clause, it was not certain that there had been a
"deprivation": the next Term a new majority was to say, again
without adequate demonstration, that both clauses applied "only
to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries result-
ing from the exercise of lawful power."310 Finally, the equation of
contract with property was at least as slippery and dangerous as
3- 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 624-25.
305 See Currie V, supra note 4, at 730 n.234, 735.
306 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857); see Currie V, supra note 3, at
726-38.
307 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 624.
38o In contrast to later cases, there was no suggestion that a strong state interest might
justify the alleged deprivation. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (finding "no
reasonable foundation for holding" a limitation on work hours "to be necessary or appropri-
ate as a health law"); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding regulation of rates of
grain elevators" 'affected with a public interest' "when such regulation becomes necessary
for the public good").
309 See Currie V, supra note 3, at 726-38 (discussing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857)).
310 Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871). Miller had argued in his
Hepburn dissent that Chase's reasoning would preclude a declaration of war or abolition of
a tariff, since the former would "lessen[]" "the value of every ship" and the latter "sink the
capital employed in the manufacture" of articles previously subject to duties. 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) at 637 (dissenting opinion). Chase conceded the principle but disputed its applica-
tion: while the issuance of a manufacturing charter causes only a "contingent and inciden-
tel" injury to competitors, the loss to creditors in the tender cases was "direct and inevita-
ble." Id. at 624. The ease with which the distinction between "direct" and "incidental"
effects could be employed to support either result suggests it was little more than a label for
the judges' independent conclusions.
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the converse feat Marshall had performed in holding that a taking
of property impaired the contract by which it had been granted;
and Marshall had at least come up with plausible reasons for his
conclusion.3 11 All Chase told us was that "[a] very large proportion
of the property of civilized men exists in the form of contracts,"312
which is only to say that they represent much of what is of value;
in every law school contract and property are the subjects of sepa-
rate courses, and there was room for a historical argument that the
phrase "life, liberty, and property" referred to the losses tradition-
ally inflicted as punishment for crime. 13
Justice Miller's concise and readable dissent, joined by
Swayne and Davis, said most of the right things.314 The very next
Term, following the retirement of the decrepit Grier 15 and the ap-
pointment of the Republicans Strong and Bradley,316 Justice
Strong said them well again,3 17 this time for a 5-to-4 majority in
3" Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136-37 (1810); see Currie III, supra note 3,
at 894-96.
312 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 624.
313 See Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the
Federal and State Constitutions which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HAav. L.
REv. 365 (1890).
314 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 626-39.
316 See supra note 255.
316 For rejection of the contention that President Grant packed the Court in order to
assure the overruling of Hepburn, see 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 516-19.
311 As a state judge in Pennsylvania, Strong had already written an opinion upholding
the legislation. Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Pa. 9, 56 (1866). There is a decided flavor in his
Supreme Court opinion of Marshall's emphasis on the intolerable consequences of an ad-
verse decision. He began by saying that if there were no authority to issue paper tender the
government would be "without those means of self-preservation which, all must admit, may,
in certain contingencies, become indispensable." 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529. Once this was
said, it was pretty clear what the result would be, for the Framers could hardly have meant
to create a government whose powers were not adequate to deal with foreseeable emergen-
cies. This sort of argument makes interpretation of the actual provisions supererogatory; as
Chase came close to saying all bad laws were unconstitutional, so Strong seemed to hint that
all good laws were valid. See Currie H, supra note 3, at 657, 688-89 (discussing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821)).
Strong may also be faulted for declining to specify to which of the enumerated powers
the tender laws were necessary and proper, though he dilated at length upon the degree of
their necessity for the good of the country. In this discussion he did stress the war effort and
the need to raise money for government expenditures, so that we may say he implicitly
related tender to the war powers and to the borrowing of money. At another point, however,
he expressly said it was not necessary that the measure be ancillary to any one of the speci-
fied powers; it was "allowable to group together any number of them and infer from them
all that the power claimed has been conferred." 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 534. Technically this
conclusion may be unobjectionable, but it seems to suggest a leniency in reviewing congres-
sional actions that borders on no review at all.
Finally, as Field pointed out in dissent, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 664-66, Strong was on
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the Legal Tender Casesf's Hepburn v. Griswold was formally
overruled.3 19
One of the principal lessons of this episode is how little gen-
eral statements of governing principles contribute to the outcome
of particular cases. The opinions on both sides of the legal tender
controversy faithfully echoed Marshall's tests for determining the
validity of laws passed under the necessary and proper clause, and
in so doing they reached diametrically opposite results. It seems
reasonably clear that it was the second legal tender decision that
more accurately captured the spirit of Marshall's formulation;
Hepburn v. Griswold, like Scott v. Sandford, was an aberration in
a history of generally sympathetic interpretation of the affirmative
grants of congressional power. Hepburn's due process holding, on
the other hand, while flatly repudiated in the Legal Tender Cases
and later ignored, was the harbinger of an idea whose time was to
come again.
dangerous ground in arguing, id. at 534-35, that the existence of the Bill of Rights implied
that Congress had broad powers not expressly listed in the Constitution; it was to preclude
the inference that a particular power was authorized because others were prohibited that
the ninth amendment provided that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IX; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (statement of Mr. Madison);
Currie I, supra note 3, at 874.
Justice Bradley, whose concurring opinion, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 554-70, showed off his
historical knowledge without adding much of substance, did discuss the Convention history
and even more brazenly spoke out for Congress's essentially unlimited powers: the federal
government was "invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of
adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as such,
and as being essential to the exercise of its functions." Id. at 556.
318 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). Chase's dissent, id. at 570-87, joined by Clifford, Field,
and Nelson, restated most of his arguments from Hepburn, adding references to the Con-
vention and to United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870), where the Court had
struck down a law regulating the inflammability of oil not passing in interstate or foreign
commerce on the ground that any impact of the law on taxes was too remote to make the
measure necessary and proper to the taxing power. Clifford wrote nearly 50 pages, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) at 587-634, and remarkably managed to add essentially nothing beyond another
discussion of the Convention history. See Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 466, 474-77 (1983). Field's equally lengthy offering, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 634-81,
detailed the Convention history, drew a negative inference from the coinage power, and
invoked the natural law passages of Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), and
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1796). Significantly, in light of Field's later opinions,
e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 136 (1877) (dissenting opinion), he did not mention due
process. Nelson, as usual, was mercifully silent. Cf. Currie IV, supra note 3, at 501, 503
(discussing the License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), and the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 283 (1849)).
319 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 553. For criticism of Chase's efforts to preclude reconsideration
of the issue by invoking an apparently fictitious agreement that the outcome of other cases
would be governed by Hepburn and an inapplicable principle limiting the reopening of judg-
ments in cases already decided, see FARMAwN, HIsTORY, supra note 4, at 738-52.
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In dealing with the great issues arising out of the Civil War
and its aftermath, the Court revealed deep divisions, sometimes
along party lines. Congress and the President did not always get
their way: the majority rejected both military trials and test oaths
and originally rejected legal tender as well, and despite its efforts
to avoid an ultimate confrontation over Reconstruction the Court
managed in United States v. Klein to set significant though poorly
defined limits to Congress's power to destroy the Court's own es-
sential functions. All the wartime financial measures, however,
eventually passed muster; and in Texas v. White, Chase finally
succeeded in writing most of the Radical philosophy of Recon-
struction into the Constitution. Overall assessments of the work of
individual Justices must await discussion of the remaining deci-
sions of the Chase period. 20
320 See Currie, supra note 127 (in press).
